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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
How do Voters Remember Flip-Flopping?  
Memorial and Social Consequences of Change Recollection 
by 
Adam Lewis Putnam 
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2015 
Professor Henry L. Roediger III, Chair 
This dissertation presents 3 experiments that explore how people notice and remember a 
politician’s change in position. Subjects read position statements made by politicians at two 
different debates; sometimes the politicians were consistent across debates, sometimes they 
changed positions, and sometimes they only addressed an issue at Debate 2. Subjects recalled the 
positions from Debate 2 and reported whether they thought the politician had changed positions 
on that issue. The results showed that changing positions made it more difficult for people to 
remember a politician’s most recent position; however, recollecting that a change occurred 
eliminated that memory deficit. Experiment 1 explored how a voter’s political orientation 
influenced their ability to remember a politician’s position and whether recollecting change 
affected voter attitudes towards a politician. Experiment 2 showed that misleading information in 
the guise of a news report can affect later change recollection, but only if subjects are unable to 
verify the accuracy of the report. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that politicians can use specific 
language to make people believe a change occurred when there was actually none. The results of 
the experiments are discussed in relation to the recursive remindings framework, the 
misinformation paradigm, and the relationship between memory and attitudes.
  
 
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
During the 2012 presidential election Mitt Romney’s public relations aid, Eric Fehrnstrom, was 
asked how the Romney campaign would shift between the Republican primary and the general 
election. Fehrnstrom’s response was, “Everything changes. It’s almost like an Etch A Sketch. 
You can kind of shake it up and restart all over again,” (Shear, 2012). Romney’s opponents 
immediately leaped at the opportunity to argue that Romney was inconsistent, disingenuous, and 
willing to say anything to win more votes. Indeed, after the election in November many pundits 
argued that Romney’s habit of flip-flopping on important issues like taxes, health insurance, and 
abortion rights was the main reason he lost to Barack Obama (Trumble, 2012).  
It is difficult to know for sure, however, how much Romney’s flip-flopping actually affected 
voters. Did any of them decide to vote for someone else or to not vote as a result of Romney’s 
changes in position? Would voters have even noticed or remembered that Romney had changed 
position if his opponents and the media had not been constantly accusing him of flip-flopping? 
Would voters have been more forgiving of Romney if he acknowledged that he had changed 
positions instead of insisting he had always believed the same thing? 
Accusing opponents of flip-flopping has a long tradition in American politics. The term appeared 
in print as early as 1890 (New York Times, 1890), and today nearly every well-known politician 
has been accused of flip-flopping at one point. Flip-flopping accusations are intended to 
disparage a politician by implying that he or she lacks conviction, may not fulfill campaign 
promises, and is willing to change their platform to appeal to more voters (Safire, 1988). 
Sometimes such accusations are warranted, and other times they are not. For example, John 
Kerry was lampooned for changing his stance on an appropriations bill for the Iraq war when he 
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said “I actually did vote for the $87 billion before I voted against it,” (e.g., Hummel, 2010), but 
he later explained that he had changed his vote because of Bush’s mishandling of the war. 
Politicians change their positions for a variety of reasons, and likewise, those changes can be 
interpreted in a variety of ways (e.g., was Obama’s reversal in opinion on same sex marriage the 
result of personal reflection and growth or an attempt to be in sync with popular opinion? See 
Bowers, 2012).  
A more basic set of questions, however, is whether people notice when a politician changes 
position, whether they remember that change in position later, and whether remembering that 
change in position affects how the voter remembers what the politician currently believes. 
Recent research (Putnam, Wahlheim, & Jacoby, 2014) explored exactly those questions by using 
realistic political materials with a proactive interference design (Anderson & Neely, 1996). In the 
experiment subjects read position statements made by fictional politicians at two different 
debates. Sometimes the politicians changed positions and sometimes they did not. Putnam et al., 
showed that it was more difficult for people to recall what a politician currently believed if the 
politician had recently changed positions than if he had not recently changed (i.e., proactive 
interference occurred). However, this difficulty in recalling the changed position disappeared if 
subjects recalled that the politician had previously changed positions. In other words, 
recollecting the change in position eliminated proactive interference. 
This dissertation reports three experiments that investigated more deeply how people notice and 
remember change in a political environment. Experiment 1 explored how political orientation 
affected change recollection and memory for a candidate’s positions and whether recollecting 
change influenced the subject’s attitudes towards the candidate. Experiment 2 examined how the 
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media influences what people remember about a politician’s flip-flopping behavior by having 
subjects read potentially misleading information from a “news” organization before attempting 
to recall what the politician believes. Finally, Experiment 3 explored whether politicians can use 
specific language to draw attention to a change in position. Before reporting the studies I will 
briefly review how classic interference theory conceptualizes the effects of change on memory, 
describe a more nuanced view that argues for the role of remindings in reducing interference in 
memory (e.g., Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2013), and summarize other research exploring political 
judgments and memory.  
1.1 Classic Interference Theory 
The case of a flip-flopping politician is structurally similar to an interference experiment. In 
memory research interference generally refers to the idea that having two similar items in 
memory can make it difficult to recall either one of them (Anderson & Neely, 1996). In a typical 
experiment, subjects study a list of paired associates, such as the word pair “dog – spoon” 
(designated as an A – B pair). Then, subjects study a second list of paired associates where there 
are both some new pairs (“car – bottle”, a C – D pair) and some pairs where the cue term is 
repeated from the first list but the target term is different (“dog – chair”, an A – D pair). At test 
subjects are provided with a cue word and asked to recall the target from list 2 (“dog – ???”). 
Typically, recall for the changed pairs (the A – D items) is worse than for the control pairs (the C 
– D items). This deficit is known as proactive interference: learning the initial A–B pairs made it 
harder to learn or retain the A – D pairs. The reverse pattern, where learning a second list makes 
it difficult to recall what was initially learned, is known as retroactive interference.  
Variations of this basic interference design have been used to understand how interference works 
and why it may contribute to forgetting (Anderson & Neely, 1996). Melton and Irwin’s (1940) 
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two factor theory of interference is one prominent hypothesis that suggests that retroactive 
interference is caused by both response competition–when a single cue has two possible 
responses, those responses compete with one another at retrieval–and unlearning, where the 
process of learning a second list of paired associates causes the association between the shared 
cue and the first target to weaken. Proactive interference, in contrast, is caused by response 
competition alone. In comprehensive reviews, Anderson and Neely (1996) and Crowder (1976, 
chapter 8) provide other conceptions of interference theory and summarize hundreds of 
experiments that show that changing an item from one list to the next generally results in 
interference. The bulk of this research uses basic materials, like paired associates, but some 
exceptions do exist, such as Loftus’s work with the misinformation paradigm that uses pictures 
of real world events (e.g., Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978). 
Based on the majority of classic interference research then, a politician (who paid attention 
during his cognitive psychology class) might expect that changing positions would make it more 
difficult for voters to remember his current position. As Crowder (1976) noted, however, 
interference theories became bulkier over time and were less able to specify a mechanism for 
forgetting that could parsimoniously explain different patterns of data. For example, there were 
some instances in the literature where change did not harm memory, but instead, enhanced it. 
These are reviewed next. 
1.2 When Change Does Not Lead to Interference 
Several experiments have reported situations where one would expect interference to occur, but 
the results show that memory for a changed item is equal to or better than memory for the control 
items (Bruce & Weaver, 1973; E. Martin, 1968; Robbins & Bray, 1974). Barnes and Underwood 
(1959), for example, had subjects learn two lists of paired associates where the cues were 
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repeated across lists, but the targets were changed. In one condition the targets changed to an 
unrelated word, but in another condition the targets changed to a synonym (e.g., insane – crazy). 
After learning the second list subjects were presented with a cue and asked to recall any 
responses that came to mind, and to identify which list each response came from (i.e., the 
modified modified free recall procedure). As expected, when the targets were unrelated 
retroactive interference occurred; but when the targets were related, retroactive facilitation 
occurred. Barnes and Underwood suggested that when the two targets were related, subjects 
could use the first list response as a mediator for learning the second list response (e.g., dog – 
insane – crazy), and indeed, subjects reported using such mediators. Other research with a 
similar paradigm (R. B. Martin & Dean, 1964) reinforced the notion that subjects were 
consciously using the relationship between the two related targets to remember them. 
More recently, however, Wahlheim and Jacoby (2013) proposed an alternative explanation for 
why changing an item could sometimes lead to facilitation, rather than interference. They 
suggested that interference should be eliminated (and sometimes facilitation could be observed) 
when subjects notice that a change has occurred (change detection) and are able to recollect that 
change at test (change recollection). Rather than using a meditational account, which required 
the items in memory to have a pre-existing association, Wahlheim and Jacoby used an 
interpretation stemming from the recursive remindings framework. 
1.3 The Recursive Remindings Framework 
A reminding experience is when one event reminds you of a previous event. Hintzman (2011) 
argued that remindings are often automatic and occur spontaneously throughout the day. For 
example, seeing a man in an office building who you have not met might remind you that you 
saw him yesterday at a meeting. Being reminded in this fashion might lead you to conclude that 
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the man is a new colleague. Hintzman (2004; 2010; 2011) and others (e.g., Benjamin & Tullis, 
2010; Benjamin & Ross, 2010) have used remindings to explain a variety of memory 
phenomena, including spacing effects, encoding variability, and concept learning. 
The role of remindings in memory is perhaps most easily explained in the context of a judgment 
of recency task, where subjects are asked to recall which of two events happened more recently. 
Tzeng and Cotton (1980) showed that subjects were much more accurate at recalling which of 
two words was presented more recently when the words were from the same category (e.g., 
apple – peach) than when they were from different categories (e.g., knife – sofa). Hintzman (e.g., 
2011) argued that when the words are related, seeing the second word spontaneously reminds 
subjects of the first word. When this reminding occurs, it causes memory for the first word to 
become embedded in memory for the second word, along with the conscious experience of 
noticing the relationship. When making the judgment of recency, subjects who are able to think 
back to that earlier reminding experience should be able to accurately judge which word 
occurred more recently, because the temporal order of the words was encoded. Seeing apple and 
being reminded of peach is qualitatively different from seeing peach and being reminded of 
apple (Hintzman, 2010).  
A similar mechanism may be at play in repetition effects, where multiple exposures of an item 
leads to better memory. Remindings are a spontaneous implicit retrieval of an earlier event, and 
as such may enhance memory (retrieval practice, see Roediger & Karpicke, 2006). Repetition 
effects then, may be due to seeing an item and being reminded that it was presented earlier. Asch 
(1969) described a fascinating experiment where subjects studied two lists of paired associates 
that were completely different except for one critical pair that was repeated in both lists. At test, 
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memory for the critical item was better than memory for the control items – but only for subjects 
who reported noticing the repetition in a post-experiment interview. Subjects likely noticed the 
repetition during the second list when seeing the critical item reminded them of seeing the item 
in the first list (i.e., they spontaneously retrieved the first list presentation). In a second 
experiment, warning subjects to look for the repetition caused nearly all of them to notice the 
repeated pair, which in turn, led to accurate recall for that item at the test. In other words, the 
instructions to look for the repetition encouraged subjects to use remindings. 
Similarly, remindings have also been used to explain spacing effects in memory (Appleton-
Knapp, Bjork, & Wickens, 2005; Wahlheim, Maddox, & Jacoby, 2014). For example, Appleton-
Knapp et al. (2005) had subjects study a booklet of advertisements where individual ads were 
repeated throughout the book at different intervals, and were either identical or slightly varied 
between presentations. After reading the booklet subjects were asked to recall details about the 
ads. The results supported the hypothesis that spacing effects may be due to subjects covertly 
retrieving a first presentation when studying a second presentation (an idea called study-phase 
retrieval). Spacing repetitions farther apart or increasing the variability of the repetitions made 
spontaneous reminding less likely to occur, but when those remindings did occur they were more 
effective at enhancing future recall than if the remindings occurred after a shorter interval (see 
also Benjamin & Tullis, 2010). Thus, both repetition effects and spacing effects may be due to 
remindings. 
Critically for the current project, remindings may also be important for noticing change (Jacoby, 
Wahlheim, & Kelly, in press; Jacoby, Wahlheim, & Yonelinas, 2013; Wahlheim & Jacoby, 
2013). Just as noticing a repetition involves looking back to an earlier event, noticing that 
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something has changed requires looking back to the original event and noticing the discrepancy. 
Detecting change in this fashion may be beneficial to memory. In the misinformation paradigm, 
for example, subjects who notice inconsistencies between the original event and the 
misinformation often do not show a memory deficit (Loftus, 1979; Tousignant, Hall, & Loftus, 
1986). This may occur because detecting the change requires implicitly retrieving the original 
event, which, due to both an implicit repetition and implicit retrieval practice, should make the 
original event more accessible in memory and allow subjects to reject the misinformation. But 
how could detecting change reduce interference in a proactive interference design where subjects 
are asked to recall the more recent item? Wahlheim and Jacoby (2013) suggested that it is not 
enough for subjects to detect a change–they must also recollect that the change occurred at test.  
1.4 Prior Research: Detecting and Recollecting Change can 
Reduce Proactive Interference 
Wahlheim and Jacoby (2013) reported three experiments showing that detecting and later 
recollecting change can reduce proactive interference.  Subjects studied two lists of paired 
associates. Some pairs appeared in both lists (repetition items, e.g., “apple-core”), some pairs 
were only presented during the second list (control items, e.g., “lamb-wool”), and some pairs had 
a target that changed between the lists (changed items, e.g., “knee-bone” became “knee-bend”).  
While studying the second list subjects pushed a button when they noticed that an item had 
changed from the first list (a measure of change detection). At test subjects were asked to recall 
the second list target in response to a cue term (“knee - ???”) after which they were asked if any 
other responses had come to mind (a measure of change recollection). 
Overall, the results showed that recall for the changed items was equal to the control items, i.e., 
that there was no proactive interference. However, recall for the changed items depended on 
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whether change was recollected. When subjects failed to recollect that a change had occurred, 
recall for the changed items was worse than it was for the control items (proactive interference); 
In contrast, when subjects did recollect change, recall for the changed items was better than it 
was for the control items (proactive facilitation). In other words, recall for the changed items was 
a mixture of proactive interference and proactive facilitation. 
Critically, Wahlheim and Jacoby (2013) showed that the improvement to memory for the 
changed items depended on both change detection and change recollection. When subjects 
detected a change but failed to recollect that change at the test, then massive interference 
occurred (recall for those items was much worse than if subjects neither detected nor recollected 
change). Wahlheim and Jacoby argued that detecting change resulted in a strengthening of the 
first list response. At the test, failing to recollect the change meant that the increased accessibility 
of the first list response led to interference. Wahlheim and Jacoby (2013) suggested that 
detecting change (being reminded of the corresponding first item when seeing the second item) 
led to memory for both items, along with the experience of detecting the change, to become 
encoded together in memory. At test, recollecting that a change had occurred allowed subjects to 
access both responses, which in turn lead to accurate recall. Thus, recollecting that a change had 
occurred counteracted the increased accessibility of the first list response due to change 
detection. 
One concern with the results of Wahlheim and Jacoby (2013) and other papers (Jacoby & 
Wahlheim, 2013; Jacoby et al., 2013) is the possibility of item selection effects that occur when 
relying on conditional analyses. Some items may be easier to remember than others; if subjects 
have a strong memory for an item, they may also be able to remember that the item changed. 
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Thus, the reduction in interference could be an artifact of the conditionalized analyses collecting 
the items that are easier to remember rather than change recollection driving the boost to 
memory. Indeed, Wahlheim and Jacoby reported hierarchal regression analyses showing that 
item effects contributed to recall. However, the models also showed that change recollection had 
a unique contribution to recall after controlling for any individual item effects. Furthermore, 
several studies now (Jacoby, 1974; Jacoby & Wahlheim, 2013; Jacoby et al., in press; Wahlheim 
et al., 2014) have shown that remindings can be brought under task control. In these experiments 
subjects study a set of items; one group is encouraged to look back to a previous event whereas 
the other group is not. The group that is given looking back instructions shows enhanced change 
detection, repetition detection, recency judgment, list discrimination, or recall compared to the 
control group. Thus, two groups of subjects study an identical set of items, but the looking back 
instructions consistently lead to better memory, suggesting that remindings are driving the boost 
in performance rather than item selection effects. 
In sum, Wahlheim and Jacoby (2013) showed that detecting and recollecting change can reduce 
proactive interference and can sometimes lead to proactive facilitation. In the introduction to 
their paper, Wahlheim and Jacoby used the example of a flip-flopping politician to highlight the 
importance of noticing and remembering change. Indeed, if a politician changed his position 
from being pro-life to being pro-choice, it may be difficult to remember what the politician 
currently believed–unless, of course, you remembered that the politician had previously changed 
positions. Putnam et al. (2014) conducted an experiment to see if noticing and remembering 
change would transfer to a fictionalized political environment. 
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1.5 Prior Research: Recollecting Change With Political 
Materials 
Putnam et al. (2014) used the same experimental design as Wahlheim and Jacoby (2013), but 
framed the experiment as a political campaign.  Instead of studying word pairs, subjects read 
about two fictional politicians (John Baker and Mike Shipman) who expressed their views on 
current political issues at two different debates. An example of the materials is presented in 
Table 1. The materials were constructed so that the candidates could change position within a 
side (liberal or conservative) because pilot work showed that subjects were at ceiling when 
detecting changes that crossed sides. The first half of each statement served as a cue (along with 
candidate information) and the second half of each statement served as the target. 
Table 1.1: Examples of Positions on an Issue 
Platform and Extremeness  Issue: Same Sex Marriage 
 
 
Liberal 
 
 Strong  Partners of the same sex should be recognized through marriage. 
  
 Weak Partners of the same sex should be recognized through civil unions. 
 
Conservative 
 
 Strong Traditional marriage should be protected through a constitutional 
amendment.  
 
 Weak Traditional marriage should be an issue for individual state legislatures. 
Note: The positions above appeared without italics in Debates 1 and 2. At test, the first portion of each 
sentence served as a cue for recall, and subjects’ task was to recall the italicized portion. When changing 
positions candidates changed within a side (liberal or conservative). 
 
Across the two debates the candidates sometimes repeated themselves (repetition items), 
sometimes addressed an issue only at the second debate (control items) and sometimes changed 
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positions across debates (changed items). At the test, subjects were cued with the candidate’s 
name and photo along with the topic and first half of the statement. Subjects tried to recall each 
candidate’s Debate 2 position by recalling the second half of the statement, and then indicated 
whether the candidate had changed position on that topic by pressing a button (a simpler, but still 
reliable, measure of change recollection; see Jacoby et al., 2013). A measure of change detection 
was omitted from all the experiments except for one because previous work showed that change 
recollection rarely occurred without previous detection (Jacoby et al. 2013). 
Across three experiments, Putnam et al. (2014) replicated the findings of Wahlheim and Jacoby 
(2013) in showing that detecting and recollecting change decreased proactive interference. 
Overall there was a proactive interference effect – recall for the changed items was worse than 
for the control items. But examining recall for the changed items as a function of whether change 
was recollected revealed a more nuanced pattern. In Experiment 1 (see the left panel of Figure 
1), for example, recall for the changed items when change was recollected was equivalent to 
recall for the control items. If change was not recollected, however, recall for the change items 
was worse than for the control items. Putnam et al. argued that recollecting change meant 
subjects had previously detected change, and that such detection meant both the first and second 
positions were encoded together in memory. Having access to this information led to accurate 
recall, thus eliminating interference. 
In Experiment 1, subjects were warned that the candidates might change positions, and that 
noticing those changes might help their memory for what the candidates believed. In Experiment 
2 one group of subjects was warned about the changes as in Experiment 1 (the informed group) 
whereas a second group of subjects was not warned about the changes (the uninformed group).  
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esults of Putnam
 et al. (2014), Experim
ents 1 - 3. C
ued recall for changed positions conditionalized on change 
recollection com
pared to recall for control positions. 
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The results (see middle panel of Figure 1) showed that pre-warning subjects did not influence 
recall. Putnam et al. (2014) suggested that the rich nature of the materials allowed subjects to 
detect and recollect change even if they were not specifically instructed to do so. 
Finally, in Experiment 3 Putnam et al. (2014) used a stronger manipulation to encourage change 
recollection. During Debate 2 one group of subjects (the informed + detection group) was asked 
to push a button when they noticed a candidate changing positions (a measure of change 
detection) whereas the other group of subjects (the uninformed group) was not warned about 
change. The results (see the right panel of Figure 1) indicated that while the uninformed group 
mirrored the pattern from earlier experiments, the informed + detection group showed proactive 
facilitation: recall for the changed items when change was recollected was better than it was for 
the control items. Furthermore, Experiment 3 also showed that both change detection and change 
recollection were required to reduce interference (see Figure 2). Detecting and recollecting 
change led to facilitation, whereas detecting change but failing to recollect the change later led to 
massive interference. Putnam et al. (2014) suggested that the inclusion of the change detection 
task increased the accuracy of the change recollection measure, which is important for finding 
proactive facilitation.  Subjects may guess about change recollection; thus, the conditionalized 
recall data would underestimate the true accuracy in recall when change is recollected. Any 
increase in change recollection accuracy would thus provide a better estimate for recall when 
change is remembered, and may be more likely to show proactive facilitation.  
In sum, the results of Putnam et al. (2014) provided further support for the hypothesis that 
detecting and recollecting change can reduce proactive interference. Importantly, the 
experiments used realistic political materials that were complex and may have interacted with a 
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subject’s pre-existing knowledge of politics. The experiments in this dissertation addressed new 
questions by using a design similar to that used in Putnam et al. For example, Experiment 1 
examined whether political orientation (both the subject’s and the candidate’s) influenced recall 
and change recollection, and began to explore how recollecting change shaped subject attitudes 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Results from Experiment 3 of Putnam et al. (2014). Cued recall for changed positions, 
conditionalized on change detection and change recollection in the informed + detection group. The black 
line indicates recall for the control positions, with standard error. 
 
towards the candidates.  Before describing the dissertation experiments in detail I will first 
briefly review some political science and social psychology literature related to how people 
remember and react to changes in political positions. 
  
 
16 
1.6 How Do People Interpret a Politician’s Change in 
Position? 
Thus far, the discussion has focused on how a politician changing positions affects memory for 
what the politician believes. But of course when politicians change positions in the real world it 
changes how the public perceives them. Politicians do occasionally change their position on a 
current issue. Sometimes there is a strong reason for it (for example, Republican congressman 
Rob Portman decided to support gay marriage after his son came out of the closet), and 
sometimes it is simply to move to a more popular position. Any change in position, however, 
raises the risk of being accused of flip-flopping, even if such accusations mischaracterize what 
really happened (Croco & Gartner, 2014). The political science literature suggests that changing 
positions too often or too quickly can have negative consequences, but that changing positions to 
a more popular stance can sometimes be advantageous. 
The obvious downside to changing positions is being accused of flip-flopping (or waffling or 
being wishy-washy). Such accusations can have two negative consequences. First, someone who 
flip-flops can become to seem unreliable or unpredictable, which can lead voters to wonder what 
position a candidate will hold in the future (e.g., Bernhardt & Ingberman, 1985). Second, 
inconsistency on its own is seen as a negative personality trait. Rosenberg, Nelson, and 
Vivekananthan (1968), for example, showed that subjects rated the traits unreliable and 
wavering about as negatively as dishonest, wasteful, and irresponsible. Thus, flip-flopping may 
lead voters to question whether a candidate is trustworthy, and whether he or she will follow 
through with campaign promises (e.g., Hummel, 2010; Tavits, 2007). Given that people value 
consistency and reliability (e.g., Cialdini, 1993), it is not surprising that flip-flopping can have 
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negative consequences. Indeed, the results of the 2004 and 2012 presidential elections showed 
what flip-flopping accusations did to John Kerry and Mitt Romney. 
In contrast, changing positions might be a smart strategy in some situations. Some political 
commentators have suggested that changing a policy position is fine, as long as the candidate is 
open about the change, is doing it in response to new information (rather than just pandering for 
votes), and is not breaking a promise (Geraghty, 2008; Safire, 1988; Dickerson, 2008). This view 
is corroborated by some empirical evidence that suggests that voter opinions of candidates are 
driven largely by the candidate’s current position and not whether he or she has changed 
positions in the past (Croco & Gartner, 2014; K. D. McCaul, Ployhart, Hinsz, & McCaul, 1995). 
Voters tend to prefer candidates who currently share their own views and do not appear to take 
past changes into account. Voters also appear to understand that politicians will shift their 
platforms between a primary and general election (Hummel, 2010), and appear to be more 
forgiving of policy changes by the President when a reason is provided for the change 
(Levendusky & Horowitz, 2012). Thus, changing positions may be an advantageous strategy if 
the change results in the candidate’s position aligning with more voters. 
Interestingly, despite the ambiguous outcomes of changing positions, both politicians and voters 
believe that the general public cares a great deal about consistency. In particular, a survey study 
showed that both college students and state legislators believed that “taking a consistent stand 
was more important to the average voter than whether a politician agreed with his or her 
constituents,” (McCaul et al., 1995, p. 298). This intuitive assumption about how voters perceive 
position changes may partially explain why politicians are so fond of accusing each other of flip-
flopping. 
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1.7 How Partisanship Affects Judgments and Memory 
To complicate things further, research suggests that people’s pre-existing attitudes can influence 
their judgments, decision-making, and memory. For instance, political orientation (or 
partisanship) may influence how people interpret a politician’s behavior. Barden, Rucker, Petty, 
and Rios (2014) had subjects read vignettes about politicians who said one thing but did another, 
and then had the subjects describe the politicians. Subjects were more likely to use the term 
“hypocrite” to describe a politician when the politician was from an opposing political party than 
from their own. Similarly, Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, and Hamann (2006) presented 
Democratic and Republican subjects with stories about George W. Bush or John Kerry changing 
his mind on an important issue and asked the subjects to provide an inconsistency rating for each 
politician. The results showed a crossover interaction based on partisanship: Democrats were 
more critical of George Bush whereas Republicans were more critical of John Kerry. Westen et 
al. suggested that this pattern was indicative of motivated reasoning, where subjects implicitly 
engaged in emotionally-based reasoning to decrease negative affect. Subjects had a harder time 
accepting their preferred candidate acting in an inconsistent manner, and thus were more likely 
to find a rational explanation for the change in position. 
In another interesting study, Nyhan and Reifler (2010) had subjects read news articles that 
contained misconceptions about current events (e.g., that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction 
before the U.S. invaded) and had subjects rate how much they agreed with the claims in the 
articles. As expected, Nyhan and Reifler found that political orientation affected belief in the 
misconceptions–subjects were more likely to believe information that was consistent with their 
worldviews. More interesting, however, is that in some conditions a correction was provided 
(e.g., that there were no WMDs in Iraq before the U.S. invasion). The corrections not only failed 
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to reduce misperceptions in some groups, but sometimes led to a backfire effect, where certain 
groups were more likely to believe in the misperception after reading a correction (i.e., in the 
example above, some conservatives were more likely to believe that Iraq had WMDs after 
reading a correction). Again, motivated reasoning was used to explain the results: subjects were 
more likely to continue to believe incorrect facts that were congruent with their own political 
orientation.  
In addition to affecting different types of judgments, political orientation may also affect 
memory for political information. The congeniality hypothesis (Eagly, Chen, Chaiken, Shaw-
Barnes, 1999; Eagly, Kulesa, Chen, & Chaiken, 2001; Levine & Murphy, 1943) posits that 
people may be better at remembering information that is consistent with their attitudes compared 
to information that is inconsistent with their attitudes. The theory suggests that people typically 
avoid information that challenges their worldview, and if they do encounter such information, 
either ignore it, distort it, or fail to store it adequately in memory. In one classic experiment, Pro-
Communist and Anti-Communist subjects were asked to remember what they read in a Pro-
Soviet Union or Anti-Soviet Union essay (Levine & Murphy, 1943). As expected, subjects 
recalled more information from the essay that was congruent with their beliefs. Although the 
congeniality hypothesis has traditionally received strong support, a recent meta-analysis (Eagly 
et al., 2001) concluded that the evidence for the congeniality hypothesis is mixed, and that there 
are a variety of ways in which people can react to uncongenial information, some of which lead 
to a deficit in encoding or later retrieval, and some of which do not. 
There are still situations, however, where political orientation can affect memory. A recent false 
memory study had thousands of people look at photographs of recent political events and report 
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whether they remembered the events happening (Frenda, Knowles, Saletan, & Loftus, 2013). 
Critically, in each group of photos there was one digitally altered photo that portrayed an event 
that never occurred. In some conditions the photo showed President Bush vacationing with a 
celebrity instead of visiting the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and in other conditions the photo 
showed President Obama shaking hands with the president of Iraq. Overall, around 50% of 
subjects claimed to remember the fabricated events – but conservatives were more likely to 
falsely remember Obama shaking hands with the president of Iraq, and liberals were more likely 
to falsely remember Bush vacationing after Katrina. The authors concluded that false memories 
were more easily formed when they were consistent with a subject’s pre-existing attitudes 
because the fabricated events seemed more familiar. 
In sum, a person’s political orientation can have a measurable impact both on how they make 
political judgments about a politician’s behavior, and how they remember political information. 
In general, people are more likely to be critical of a politician from a different political party than 
their own (and more forgiving of a politician from their own political party) and may find it 
easier to remember information that is consistent with their existing political beliefs. 
1.8 Overview of The Experiments 
Three experiments explored change recollection and memory in politics. All three used the 
design used in Putnam et al. (2014) with a revised set of political materials (described in the 
norming study below). Subjects were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website to 
ensure political diversity. A brief overview of each experiment is provided below, with more 
detailed hypotheses in the introduction to each experiment. 
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1.9 Experiment 1: The Intersection of Attitudes With 
Change Recollection 
Experiment 1 had two main goals. The first was to examine whether partisanship affected 
memory and change recollection. In particular, the congeniality hypothesis (e.g., Eagly et al., 
2001) predicted that subjects should be better at recalling the positions of a candidate from their 
own political party. Extending that hypothesis to change recollection suggested that subjects 
would be better at recollecting change when a candidate had similar political views to the 
subject. 
The second goal was to examine whether recollecting change influenced subject attitudes 
towards the candidates. Experiment 1 added two opportunities for subjects to rate the politicians 
on several measures (e.g., How trustworthy is this candidate? How likely is this candidate to 
change positions in the future?). In general, there were two hypotheses. The first was that 
subjects would support their own candidates, regardless of how much they remembered each 
candidate changing position. This position would be supported if subjects provided positive 
ratings to the candidate from their own party, and lower ratings to the candidate from the 
opposite party. A second hypothesis was that voters might disapprove of politicians who changed 
positions too often. This position would be supported if the subjects provided low ratings overall 
for both candidates, or if there was a negative correlation between change recollection and the 
judgments. Such a correlation would indicate that recollecting change more often was associated 
with a more negative attitudes towards the candidates.  
1.10 Experiment 2: Does the News Create a Misinformation 
Effect? 
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Experiment 2 introduced a misinformation element: after Debate 2 but before the final test 
subjects read statements from a “news” organization that sometimes reported correct information 
about a candidate (“Mike Shipman was consistent in his view on Same Sex Marriage” when he 
did not change positions) and sometimes reported misleading information (“John Baker changed 
position on Gun Control” when he did not change positions). Subjects were asked to verify the 
truthfulness of each statement. I predicted that for the changed items, accurately verifying a news 
statement would lead to accurate recall and change recollection at the final test. A correct 
response during the news phase would indicate that subjects were able to recollect the presence 
or absence of change (they accessed the recursive trace) and should subsequently lead to better 
recall and change recollection on the final test for the changed items. In contrast, subjects who 
endorsed a misleading statement (e.g., agreeing that a candidate had changed positions when he 
did not) should lead to poor change recollection accuracy during the final test, which in turn 
should lead to poor recall for the changed items. 
1.11 Experiment 3: Can Politicians Use Language to Draw 
Attention to a Change in Position? 
Finally, Experiment 3 explored whether politicians could use specific language to increase the 
odds of someone remembering a change in position. During the second debate, short phases were 
included before each of the position statements. Some of them were neutral (e.g., I’m happy to 
talk about that issue today…) whereas some of them encouraged subjects to look back to the first 
debate (e.g., In contrast to my previous position, I now believe…). Previous research has shown 
that different instructions can influence the degree to which subjects look back to notice 
repetitions (Wahlheim et al., 2014) or change (Jacoby et al., in press), so the looking back 
statements here should encourage subjects to notice inconsistencies, which in turn should lead to 
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more accurate change recollection and higher recall for the changed items. However, instructions 
to look back have always been manipulated between-subjects; here the looking back cue is 
manipulated within-subjects, appears in a mixed-list format, and is integrated as part of the 
materials. Thus, an alternative hypothesis, drawn from Loftus’s (1979) work exploring blatant 
change, is that once subjects notice a single change, they will continue to look for other 
inconsistencies.  
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Chapter 2: Norming Study 
The goal of the norming study was to calibrate a revised set of political materials. The materials 
in Putnam et al. (2014) suffered from two weaknesses. First, subjects sometimes confused two 
different topics during recall. For example, the topics Gun Control and Concealed Weapons 
resulted in many cross-topic contaminations where subjects recalled a statement from Gun 
Control in response to the Concealed Weapons cue. Such overlap may cause subjects to be 
reminded of a similar topic presented in Debate 2, rather than thinking back to the appropriate 
response in Debate 1. Second, some of the statements within a particular topic were quite similar, 
raising the concern that they would be interpreted as a change in wording, rather than a true 
change in position. For the revised materials, I removed topics that showed cross-topic 
contamination in Putnam et al. (2014), and re-wrote the position statements to make the 
differences more distinct. 
In the norming study, subjects were presented with statements and asked to rate how 
conservative or liberal they thought each statement was. After a group of 30 - 35 subjects rated 
the materials, I checked to see whether the materials met the criteria described below. Materials 
that did not meet the criteria were revised and tested again. Once an item met the criteria in two 
consecutive waves, it was considered complete and not tested again. A second goal of the 
norming study was to evaluate methods or assessing the political orientation and political 
expertise of the subjects. 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Subjects 
351 subjects were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, with participation limited to IP 
addresses originating in the United States. The data from 24 subjects were excluded because they 
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failed the political expertise quiz or reported low levels of political expertise, leaving a sample of 
327 subjects (168 female). The average age of the final sample was 36.90 (SD = 12.22, range = 
16 - 68), with 47 different states represented. Subjects were asked to report their level of 
education (13% reported high school education or less, 37% reported some college education or 
an associates degree, and 50% reported a bachelor’s degree or graduate degree) and twelve 
subjects reported being born outside the U.S. (their data did not differ significantly from the rest 
of the sample). Subjects were paid between $0.25 and $3.00 for participating, depending on the 
length of the study (pro-rated at $3.00 per hour). The Washington University in St. Louis 
Institutional Review Board approved the norming study and the remaining experiments. 
2.1.2 Materials 
Political Orientation Surveys. Subjects completed both a self-report and objective measure of 
their political orientation. For the self-report measure, subjects were asked “Which category best 
represents your political views?” and selected one of the following responses: Liberal Democrat, 
Average Democrat, Moderate Democrat, Independent, Moderate Republican, Average 
Republican, and Conservative Republican.  
For the objective measure, subjects rated their agreement with 12 statements about current 
political issues (e.g. “There need to be stricter laws and regulations to protect the environment” - 
see Appendix D for list of all statements). The 12 statements were taken from a Pew Research 
center survey that was administered to a large, representative sample of U.S. citizens, and were 
the items that most accurately predicted each respondent’s political orientation on the seven-
point scale described above. This approach to objectively measuring political orientation was 
used by Zell and Bernstein (2014) who found that young adults often reported being more 
conservative than an objective measure would suggest. 
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The population in the norming study replicated the pattern found in Zell and Bernstein (2014). 
By the self-report measure, the sample leaned left: 53% Democrat, 26% Independent, and 20% 
Republican. By the objective measure, however, the sample was even more liberal: 70% 
Democrat, 7% Independent, and 22% Republican, with 56% of respondents falling into the 
“Liberal Democrat” category. Thus, subjects in the sample were more likely liberal than they 
believed themselves to be. 
Political Expertise Survey. Subjects also completed a self-report and objective measure of their 
political expertise. Subjects who scored below a set criteria were omitted from data analyses in 
the norming study and the other experiments. For the self-report measure, subjects were asked 
“How much do you think you know about American Politics?” and used a slider to report their 
response. The slider response was converted to a 100 point scale, with 0 representing low 
knowledge and 100 representing high knowledge; subjects who reported a score less than 10 
were excluded. The objective measure consisted of an eight-item political expertise quiz 
(adapted from Lambert et al. 2010, see Appendix C). Each item was a multiple-choice question, 
with questions such as “Before his election as Vice President, which state did Joe Biden 
represent in his role as U.S. senator?” Subjects who answered fewer than three questions 
correctly were excluded from all analyses. 
The average response for the subjective measure of political expertise was 60.02 (SD = 23.80) 
indicating that subjects felt they had a moderate knowledge of politics. For the 8 item political 
expertise quiz, 17% scored a 3 or 4, 32% scored a 5 or 6 and 50% scored a 7 or 8, with a mean 
score of 6.26 (SD = 1.55). Thus, from a more objective perspective the pool had a fairly good 
understanding of American politics. Twenty-four subjects were omitted from analysis, 13 for 
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reporting less than a 10 on the self-report question, and 14 for scoring less than a 3 on the quiz 
(some failed both). 
Political Materials. The materials were based on those used in Putnam et al. (2014) and 
consisted of 36 current political issues, with 4 position statements associated with each topic. 
The four positions statements were composed of a strong liberal position, a weak liberal position, 
a weak conservative position, and a strong conservative position. Within a side (liberal or 
conservative) the first part of the sentence was identical, which allowed the first half of the 
sentence to serve as a retrieval cue during the main experiments. The sentence structure allowed 
candidates to change from a strong position to a weak position or vice-versa. Table 1 shows an 
example of an individual topic, and Appendix A displays the final set of political materials 
developed during the norming study.  
2.1.3 Procedure 
Subjects were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk Website (Mason & Suri, 2012), and 
completed the experiment on their own computer (presented in Adobe Flash, Weinstein, 2012). 
Upon starting the experiment subjects read an informed consent letter and reported basic 
demographic information (age, gender, current state, whether they were born in the United 
States, and education). 
Subjects then read instructions for the study. They were informed that they would be presented 
with a current political topic and four related position statements. Their job was to rate how 
conservative or liberal they thought each statement was by using a slider anchored with “liberal” 
on the left and “conservative” on the right.  
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There were two versions of the norming study. In both versions the topics appeared in a random 
order. In the first version subjects saw a topic and a statement, and after 1.5 seconds the slider 
appeared below. Subjects made their rating, and then pressed “enter” or clicked the submit 
button to finalize their response. If subjects did not respond within 50 seconds a message 
appeared urging them to respond, and if they still did not respond after 10 additional seconds 
then a response was not recorded. After making their response a blank screen appeared for 500 
ms and then the next statement appeared. After rating the four statements associated with a topic, 
subjects moved on to the next topic. 
In the second version, subjects rated all four statements associated with a topic at once, rather 
than seeing them one by one. In this version, a topic appeared along with the four position 
statements. After 8 seconds, a slider appeared for each statement, and subjects made their ratings 
while seeing all four statements. After making a rating for each statement the “submit” button 
appeared that allowed subjects to save their responses. A warning message appeared after 3 
minutes and 50 seconds, and if subjects did not submit their response within 4 minutes, their 
responses were not recorded. 
After rating all of the topics, subjects completed the political expertise and political orientation 
measures and then were taken to a slide that contained a debriefing letter along with instructions 
for receiving payment. 
The experiment was completed in waves. After 30 to 36 subjects rated the materials (the n varied 
due to the number of subjects who failed the expertise measures), I checked the ratings to see if 
they met the criteria described below. Any items that failed were revised and tested in the next 
wave. Each wave used one of the two versions of the experiment. The first version mirrored how 
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subjects read the statements in the main experiments (seeing one topic at a time) whereas the 
second version allowed subjects to read all four statements before making their rating, perhaps 
providing a more accurate estimate. Once a topic met the criteria in two consecutive waves, it 
was considered complete and omitted from future waves. 
2.1.4 Results 
Subjects used a slider to rate the materials which was converted to a 100 point scale, with zero 
representing liberal and 100 representing conservative. Each item was revised until it met two 
criteria: 1) the difference between the strong and weak version of each statement was at least 
seven and 2) the strong liberal position had a score of less than 25 while the strong conservative 
position had a score of greater than 75. These criteria ensured that the strong and weak positions 
were distinct from one another and that the strong positions were indeed more extreme. Table 2 
shows the average ratings for each statement in its final wave along with the difference in the 
scores between the strong and weak position on each issue. The actual items are reported in 
Appendix A. Subject ratings were unaffected by their political orientation or their political 
expertise. 
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Table 2.1: Political Orientation Ratings for Statements and Topics 
 Liberal  Conservative 
 Strong Weak Difference  Weak Strong Difference 
Abortion 10.75 34.94 -24.19  71.94 89.00 17.06 
Affirmative Action 22.06 42.22 -20.17  61.14 75.97 14.83 
Affordable Care Act 23.50 34.50 -11.00  76.28 86.28 10.00 
Alternative Energy 16.06 41.69 -25.63  44.00 77.89 33.89 
American Patriotism 23.27 57.00 -33.73  72.82 84.07 11.25 
Border Security 15.81 34.25 -18.44  57.17 88.00 30.83 
Contraception 12.74 23.51 -10.77  63.09 82.34 19.26 
Death Penalty 21.19 36.97 -15.78  63.28 77.72 14.44 
Don't Ask Don't Tell 16.11 37.83 -21.72  72.92 90.78 17.86 
Flag Desecration 21.00 41.70 -20.70  74.52 82.45 7.94 
Global Warming 21.94 43.75 -21.81  70.69 84.08 13.39 
Government Debt 26.25 47.43 -21.18  60.76 83.21 22.45 
Gun Control 19.28 32.84 -13.56  61.94 78.47 16.53 
Health Care 9.69 21.89 -12.20  74.43 82.91 8.49 
Immigration Benefits 17.96 31.93 -13.96  79.39 90.57 11.18 
Labor Unions 11.94 19.00 -7.06  72.03 89.21 17.18 
Legal. of Marijuana 14.67 28.50 -13.83  69.53 88.39 18.86 
Mitt Romney 15.33 50.97 -35.64  70.00 85.81 15.81 
Nuclear Weapons 17.47 44.00 -26.53  71.56 80.86 9.31 
Occupy Wall Street 19.82 27.18 -7.36  66.68 88.18 21.50 
Off-shore Oil Drilling 15.44 29.50 -14.06  67.28 80.94 13.67 
Paying for College 13.07 25.32 -12.25  76.25 86.00 9.75 
President Obama 18.39 36.06 -17.67  69.61 88.81 19.19 
Role of Government 20.15 37.71 -17.56  48.26 76.53 28.26 
Same Sex Marriage 13.75 32.03 -18.28  66.72 78.92 12.19 
School Safety 17.94 38.16 -20.22  65.97 87.53 21.56 
Public Schools 15.97 32.37 -16.40  69.29 79.71 10.43 
Separ. of Church & State 18.92 31.58 -12.67  66.03 85.86 19.83 
Sex Education 17.33 31.42 -14.08  64.14 89.47 25.33 
Social Security 23.23 37.80 -14.57  59.29 77.00 17.71 
Stem Cell Research 17.42 47.92 -30.50  71.36 90.44 19.08 
Teaching Creationism 18.71 48.51 -29.80  73.09 86.60 13.51 
Trickle Down Econ. 13.76 32.91 -19.15  63.18 85.09 21.91 
United Nations 23.36 53.58 -30.22  55.19 76.28 21.08 
War on Terror 18.21 44.41 -26.21  58.44 85.47 27.03 
Welfare 14.73 23.91 -9.18  67.64 88.55 20.91 
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Chapter 3: Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 had two main goals. The first goal was to evaluate whether partisanship affected 
recall or change recollection. As described earlier, one prediction, inspired by the congeniality 
hypothesis (Eagly et al., 2001; Levine & Murphy, 1943) is that people will find it easier to 
remember information that is consistent with their attitudes. However, evidence for the 
congeniality hypotheses is mixed (Eagly, Chen, Chaiken, & Shaw-Barnes, 1999; Eagly et al., 
2001). An alternative possibility is that recall may be unaffected by partisanship (subjects will 
recall the Democratic and Republican candidate’s positions equally well) – some researchers 
have suggested that critiquing information that is inconsistent with one’s own view is an 
effective encoding strategy. Both predictions can be extended from overall recall to change 
recollection. Subjects may be better at noticing and remembering changes in a candidate’s 
positions when the candidate is from their own political party (e.g., an extreme conservative 
might not realize that supporting sex same marriage might be different from supporting same sex 
civil unions). In contrast, as reviewed above, subjects are often more critical of politicians from a 
different political party (e.g., Nyhan & Reifler, 2010), and thus subjects might be better at 
recollecting change when the candidate is from a different political party. Of course, a final 
possibility is that change recollection is unaffected by partisanship. 
The second goal of Experiment 1 is to determine whether noticing and remembering change 
influences how voters perceive the candidates. If subjects remember a politician changing 
positions quite often, would they be less willing to vote for him? Would they trust or like him 
less? On one hand, voters may distrust a candidate who they perceive as changing positions–it is 
hard to trust someone if he or she is inconsistent. On the other hand, voters may prefer the 
candidate from their own party regardless of how often they changed positions. A third 
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possibility is that voters may be drawn to candidates who change their positions to be more in 
line with the voter’s own views - however, this would be difficult to explore in the current 
paradigm as candidates never change sides entirely. 
Experiment 1 used the design from Putnam et al. (2014)1. Subjects were introduced to two 
political candidates, a Democrat and a Republican, and were told they would be reading excerpts 
from two debates where the candidates expressed their views on current political issues. Across 
the two debates the candidates sometimes held the same positions, sometimes changed positions, 
and sometimes address an issue only at the second debate. Subjects then attempted to recall each 
candidate’s position from Debate 2 and indicated whether the candidate had changed positions. 
After both Debate 1 and the recall test subjects were asked which candidate they would vote for 
and made ratings about each candidate’s trustworthiness, likability, and likelihood that the 
candidate would change positions in the future. 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Subjects 
The subjects were 126 (63 female) Mechanical Turk workers who had IP addresses originating 
from the United States. Nine additional subjects participated, but were dropped from the 
experiment; five for failing the instructional manipulation check (described below), three for 
reporting low levels of political knowledge, and one for failing the political expertise quiz. The 
average age of the final sample was 37 (SD = 11.82) with ages ranging from 19 to 66. Subjects 
                                                
 
 
1 A third goal was to replicate the results of Putnam et al. (2014) with the online subject pool and revised 
political materials 
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reported their level of education (9% indicated high school education or less, 40% indicated 
some college, and 52% indicated a bachelor’s or graduate degree), which state they were in (36 
states were represented), and whether they were born in the United States (6 were not). Subjects 
completed the experiment on their own computers and were paid $3 for participating in the hour-
long experiment. 
Subjects were asked to report their political orientation (the self-report measure described in the 
norming study) before starting the experiment. In this way, I was able to recruit an equal number 
of self-reported Democrats and Republicans (50 each) and a smaller number of Independents 
(26) (once a bin reached its maximum, other subjects who fit in that category were told they were 
ineligible for the experiment). The objective political orientation measure revealed that the 
sample was more liberal than they reported, with 75 Democrats, 10 Independents, and 41 
Republicans, replicating Zell and Bernstein’s (2014) finding that people often under-estimate 
how liberal they are. Subjects reported a mean political expertise of 58.74 (SD = 21.77) on the 
self-report question and correctly answered an average of 6.02 out of 8 questions (SD = 1.66) on 
the political expertise quiz (The averages for the expertise measures did not include subjects who 
were omitted). 
3.1.2 Materials  
The revised political materials (see Appendix A) and the measures of political expertise and 
political orientation described in the norming study were used. Additional materials included 
photos of the two candidates and of the locations where the two “debates” occurred (see 
Appendix B). 
3.1.3 Design and Counterbalancing 
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The experiment used a 3 (Position Type: repetition, control, changed) x 2 (position strength: 
strong, weak) x 2 (statement orientation: strong, weak) within-subjects design. The 36 political 
topics were divided into three groups of 12, and the three groups were rotated through the 
different conditions (repetition, control, changed). Within each group, half of the topics 
presented the strong position at Debate 2, and half presented the weak position at Debate 2; this 
grouping was counterbalanced across subjects. Thus, each candidate addressed 24 topics at 
Debate 1 (12 to be repeated and 12 to be changed) and 36 topics at Debate 2 (12 from each 
condition).  
In addition, the political affiliation of each candidate was counterbalanced across subjects. For 
half of the subjects Mike Shipman was a Republican and John Baker was a Democrat, whereas 
for the other half of the subjects the political parties were reversed. 
3.2 Procedure 
Before beginning the experiment subjects read an online informed consent letter and agreed to 
participate. They then answered the demographics questions (described in the norming study) 
and reported their political orientation. One additional question was an instructional 
manipulation check to determine whether subjects were reading the instructions (Oppenheimer, 
Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). It appeared to be a question asking subjects to check boxes 
corresponding to what news sources they followed, but the paragraph of instructions told 
subjects to ignore the check boxes and to type the word “understand” in a text box. The data 
from subjects who failed the instructional manipulation check (five in Experiment 1) were 
excluded from all analyses. 
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Before beginning the experiment subjects were introduced to the “campaign.” They saw the 
names, photos, and party affiliations of the two candidates, and were informed that the two 
politicians debated each other twice over the course of the campaign. Subjects saw a photo of 
where Debate 1 occurred, and read instructions indicating that they would be reading debate 
excerpts and trying to form an impression of the candidates. 
During Debate 1 each trial presented one statement from a candidate. The candidate’s name, 
face, party affiliation (just a D or R) and the current topic appeared on screen for 2 seconds. Then 
the candidate’s position on that topic appeared for 7 seconds, after which there was a 500 ms 
blank screen before the next trial began. The statements were presented in a random order, with 
only the repetition and changed items being presented for a total of 48 items (24 for each 
candidate). 
After finishing Debate 1, subjects were asked to vote for one of the candidates. Then, they 
answered three questions for each candidate: 1) “How much do you like this candidate?” 2) 
“How trustworthy is this candidate?” and 3) “How likely is this candidate to change positions in 
the future?” Subjects responded by using a slider, dragging it to the left to indicate dislike, 
distrust, or a low estimate of future change and dragging it to the right to indicate likability, trust, 
or a high estimate of future change. 
Subjects then spent 3 minutes on a distractor task, writing about what they would have done in 
October in the two weeks between the debates. Then subjects saw a picture of the college 
activity center where Debate 2 was held, and read instructions telling them that they would be 
reading debate excerpts again. Subjects were informed that they would be seeing some old topics 
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and some new topics, and that for the old topics they should try and notice when the candidates 
changed positions. Subjects were also told to try and remember each candidate’s position. 
All of the item types (repetition, changed, control) were presented during Debate 2, for 72 total 
presentations (36 for each candidate). 
Immediately after finishing Debate 2 subjects began the cued recall test, where they were told to 
try and remember each candidate’s most recent position. On a test trial subjects were cued with a 
candidate’s name, photo, topic, and the first half of his position statement, and were asked to 
type in the remainder of his position from Debate 2. After submitting a response subjects were 
asked “Did this candidate change positions on this topic between Debate 1 and Debate 2?” and 
clicked a “yes” or “no” button (the measure of change recollection). There was no time limit for 
responding, and subjects were tested on all 72 position statements.  
After completing the recall test subjects voted again, and answered the same set of questions that 
was presented after Debate 1. One additional question asked: “This candidate addressed 36 
topics across the two debates. How many times do you think he changed positions between 
Debate 1 and Debate 2?” Subjects used a pull down menu to select a number between 0 and 36. 
After answering all of the questions, subjects completed the objective political orientation quiz, 
reported their own level of political expertise, and took the political expertise quiz. Finally, they 
were taken to a thanks and debriefing page where they were provided with instructions for 
receiving payment.  
3.3 Results 
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The cued recall responses were coded by two independent raters (inter-rater reliability was 
reasonably high, as measured by Cohen’s Kappa, .75), and any differences were resolved 
through discussion. The effect sizes for t tests reported below are Cohen’s d, and a Bonferroni 
correction was used for all post-hoc analyses unless otherwise mentioned. Several analyses 
explored the effects of a subjects’ political orientation on other variables; although subjects 
reported their orientation on a 7-point scale, for simplicity the analyses below used only three 
categories: Democrat, Independent, and Republican. Additional analyses are included in 
Appendix E that use the full 7-point scale and the objective measure of political orientation 
(along with some additional exploratory analyses). In general, however, the self-reported and 
objective measures of political orientation led to consistent results. 
3.3.1 Recall 
As expected, proactive interference occurred: the repetition items (M = .57, SEM = .02) led to 
better recall than the control items (M = .49, SEM = .02) which in turn were better than the 
changed items, (M = .37, SEM = .02), F(2, 250) = 116.93, p < .001, ηp2 = .48. Planned 
comparisons revealed that all of the differences were significant, ts(125) > 6.06, ps < .001, ds > 
0.40. 
Figure 3 shows recall collapsed across item type for the Democratic and Republican candidate as 
a function of self-reported political orientation. A 3 (subject political orientation: Democrat, 
Independent, Republican) x 2 (candidate party: Democrat, Republican) mixed-model ANOVA 
failed to reveal a main effect of political orientation, F(2, 123) = 2.81, p = .064, ηp2 = .04, or of 
candidate political party, F(1, 123) = 0.04, p = .837, ηp2 = .000. The interaction, however, was 
significant, F(2, 123) = 3.34, p = .039, ηp2 = .05, suggesting that a congeniality effect may have 
occurred. Simple effects analyses revealed that the self-reported Democrats had better recall for 
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the Democratic candidate’s positions than the Republican candidate’s positions (.51 vs. .48), p = 
.048, but that the self-reported Independents and Republicans had similar recall for both 
candidates (ts < 1.10). 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Cued recall as a function of self-reported political orientation for the two different candidates. 
Error bars represent standard error of the means. 
 
To confirm whether a congeniality effect occurred, I compared recall for when a subject’s 
political party was congruent with the candidate’s (Democrats recalling Democratic positions 
and Republicans recalling Republican positions, M = .51, SEM = .02) to when it was incongruent 
(Democrats recalling Republican positions and Republicans recalling Democratic positions M = 
.49, SEM = .02). Despite the difference between the means only being .02, a paired-samples t-
test revealed that recall for the congruent positions was indeed better than for the incongruent 
positions, t(99) = 2.22, p = .029, d = 0.11, albeit with a very small effect size. This analysis 
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suggested that subjects may be better at recalling political information when the candidate is 
from their own political party rather than a different one (i.e., a congeniality effect).  
3.3.2 Change Recollection 
Table 3 shows how accurate subjects were in recollecting change. Recollecting change for a 
changed item was treated as a hit and recollecting change for a control item was treated as a false 
alarm. Table 3 also shows the signal detection measures of d’ and c. Subjects successfully 
discriminated the changed items from the control items: d’ was greater than zero, t(125) = 12.15, 
p < .001, d = 1.08.  
Table 3.1: Probabilities of Change Recollection and Signal Detection Measures in Experiment 1 
 Item Type  SDT Measure 
 Control (FAs) Changed (Hits)  d’ c 
Experiment 1      
Mean .13 .37  0.86 0.87 
SEM .01 .02  0.07 0.06 
 
Did political orientation influence change recollection? Table 4 shows change recollection 
accuracy (measured by d’) for the two candidates as a function of subject political orientation. A 
3 (subject political orientation: Democrat, Independent, Republican) x 2 (candidate political 
party: Democrat, Republican) mixed model ANOVA failed to reveal any main effects or 
interactions, Fs < 2.45, suggesting that the ability for subjects to recollect change was unaffected 
by partisanship. I also conducted a congruency analysis (similar to that done with recall above) 
but failed to show a difference in change recollection for the congruent and incongruent items, t 
< 1. 
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Table 3.2: Change Recollection Accuracy, Measured by d’ for the Different Candidates as a 
Function of Subject’s Self-Reported Political Orientation 
 Democratic Candidate Republican Candidate 
Democrat .88 (.12) .94 (.11) 
Independent .50 (.13) .56 (.16) 
Republican .83 (.12) .80 (.11) 
Note. Standard errors presented in parentheses. 
 
3.3.3 Recall Conditionalized on Change Recollection 
Figure 4 shows recall for the changed items conditionalized on whether change was recollected 
compared to recall for the control items. As predicted, failing to recollect change led to proactive 
interference; recall for the changed items was worse than for the control items, t(125) = 12.44, p 
< .001, d = 1.18. In contrast, when change was recollected, recall for the changed items was not 
significantly different from recall for the control items, t(116) = 1.03, p = .31, d = 0 (the 
difference in degrees of freedom for the conditional analyses represents subjects who did not 
have an observation in a particular cell). In other words, recollecting change eliminated proactive 
interference, replicating the results of Putnam et al. (2014).  
One concern with using conditional analyses is the possibility of item selection effects and 
differences in subject memory abilities. In line with previous research (Jacoby et al. in press; 
Putnam et al. 2014; Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2013), I conducted hierarchical linear regression 
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analyses at the item and subject level to see if change recollection made a unique contribution to 
recall of the changed items.  
 
Figure 3.2: Cued recall for the changed positions conditionalized on change recollection, as compared to 
the control condition in Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard error of the means. 
 
The left column of Table 5 shows the regression model for items. Estimates for each measure 
were calculated for each of the 144 items.  At the first step, recall for the control items was 
entered; at the second step change recollection (as measured by hits – false alarms) was entered; 
and at the third step the interaction was entered. Recall for the changed items was the outcome 
variable. As expected, item differences accounted for significant variance in predicting recall for 
the changed items (the outcome variable), but change recollection did explain additional variance 
(.06) above any item differences. The interaction did not improve prediction. The proportion of 
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variance accounted for by change recollection was similar to previous research (Putnam et al. 
2014), suggesting that change recollection did enhance recall of the changed items. 
The right column of Table 5 displays a similar analysis, but collapsing across items to get an 
estimate for individual subjects. Subject differences explained a large portion of the variance, 
with change recollection only explaining a small amount of additional variance (this additional 
variance was marginally significant). The interaction did not explain additional variance. The 
proportion of unique variance explained by change recollection is much smaller than in previous 
experiments. One potential explanation is that change recollection accuracy was correlated with 
recall for the control positions, r = .55, p < .001, meaning there could be multicollinearity, which 
can limit the total variance explained (Fields et al., 2012). In addition, individual differences in 
subject abilities could have been greater in a sample recruited from the internet than in a 
laboratory-based sample. In sum, however, both models suggest that change recollection is 
accounting for a unique but small amount of the variance above any item selection or individual 
subject effects. 
Table 3.3: Proportion of Variance in Recall of Changed Positions Explained by Item 
Differences, General Memory Ability, and Change Recollection in Experiment 3. 
 Unit of Analysis 
 Items Subjects 
Step 1   
Item Differences / General Memory .39 (p < .001) .56 (p < .001) 
Step 2   
Change Recollection (Hits - FA) .06 (p < .001) .01 (p = .056) 
Step 3   
Interaction .003 (p = .445) .01 (p = .194) 
  
 
43 
Note: Values displayed above are ∆R2 on each step of the model computed at the item level 
collapsed across subjects (left) and at the subject level collapsed across items (right). “Item 
Differences” refers to item differences in control position recall performance, “General Memory” 
refers to individual differences in control position recall performance, and “Change Recollection 
(Hits - FA)” refers to individual differences in discriminability of change recollection for 
changed positions. 
 
 
3.3.4 Subject Judgment Results 
Voting. Table 6 shows the voting choices for the subjects at Debate 1 and after the recall test as a 
function of their self-reported political orientation. As expected, subjects tended to vote along 
party lines. Only six subjects changed which candidate they voted for between Debate 1 and the 
recall test.  
Table 3.4: Voting Results for the Two Candidates After Debate 1 and After the Recall Test by 
Subject Political Orientation, Experiment 1 
 
  Debate 1  Recall Test 
 Democrat Republican  Democrat Republican 
Total Votes  75 51  79 47 
Self-Reported 
Political Orientation 
      
Democrats  49 1  50 0 
Independents  17 9  19 7 
Republicans  9 41  10 40 
 
Estimates of future change. Table 7 displays the ratings that subjects made about the two 
candidates after Debate 1 and the recall test, broken down by the subjects’ self-reported political 
orientation. Subjects rated each candidate individually on the probability of their changing 
positions in the future, their likability, and their trustworthiness twice: once after Debate 1 and 
once after the recall test. In addition, after the recall test, subjects estimated how often each 
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candidate changed positions between the two debates. The bottom row represents the average 
change in scores between Debate 1 and the recall test. 
The third and fourth columns of Table 7 display the subject estimates of future change for each 
candidate. At Debate 1, a 3 (subject political orientation) X 2 (candidate party) mixed-model 
ANOVA revealed a main effect of candidate party, suggesting that the subjects predicted that the 
Democratic candidate was more likely to change positions than the Republican candidate, F(1, 
123) = 3.91, p = .05, ηp2 = .03.  
There was no main effect of subject political orientation nor a significant interaction (both Fs < 
1). In contrast, at the recall test, a 3 X 2 ANOVA failed to show an effect of candidate party, F(2, 
123) = 2.46, p = .09, ηp2 = .04. (Also, there was no main effect of subject political orientation nor 
an interaction, both Fs < 1). In sum, after Debate 1 subjects predicted that the Democratic 
candidate would be more likely to change positions in the future than the Republican candidate, 
but after the recall test made similar estimates for both candidates. Furthermore, it appeared that 
subjects estimated both candidates as being more likely to change positions in the future after the 
test than after Debate 1, ts(125) > 5.22, ps < .001, ds > 0.61.  
The future change estimates that occurred after the test appeared to be informed by change 
recollection. The hit rates for recollecting change for the individual candidates was correlated 
with their respective estimates of future change: r = .33, p < .001 for the Democrat and r = .32, p 
< .001 for the Republican (see top row of Figure 5). Furthermore, the hit rates were also 
correlated with the change in the estimates between Debate 1 and the test: r = .27, p = .002 for 
the Democrat and r =.27, p = .002 for the Republican.  
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Estimates of Past Change. After finishing the test, subjects were asked to estimate how many 
times each candidate changed positions; the first two columns of Table 7 shows the estimates. A 
3 (subject orientation) X 2 (candidate party) mixed-model ANOVA failed to reveal any 
significant main effects or an interaction (all Fs < 1), suggesting that neither a subject’s own 
political orientation nor the political party of the candidate influenced past estimates of change. 
How often subjects recollected change for each candidate, however, did appear to influence their 
estimates of past change. The hit rates for recollecting change for each candidate correlated with 
their overall estimates of past change: r = .48, p < .001 for the Democrat and r = .51, p = .001 for 
the Republican. 
Trustworthiness Ratings. As a reminder, there were two predictions about the trustworthiness 
and likability ratings, 1) that subjects would prefer the candidate from their own party (and 
dislike the opposite candidate) regardless how often the candidate change positions, and 2) that 
subjects would provide lower ratings to the candidates who they perceived as changing positions 
more often. The fifth and sixth columns of Table 7 display the trustworthiness ratings at Debate 
1 and after the test for each candidate as a function of subject political orientation. For the 
Debate 1 ratings a 3 (political orientation) x 2 (candidate party) mixed-model ANOVA revealed 
a main effect of candidate party indicating that the Democrat was perceived as more trustworthy 
than the Republican, F(1, 123) = 21.30, p < .001, ηp2 = .15, and an interaction, indicating that 
subjects provided higher trustworthiness ratings to the candidate from their own party, F(1, 123) 
= 21.30, p < .001, ηp2 = .15. There was no main effect of subject political orientation, F < 1. The 
ratings after the recall test yielded an identical pattern: there was a main effect of candidate 
party, F(1, 123) = 19.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .14, a significant interaction, F(2, 123) = 37.93, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .38, and no effect of subject political orientation (F < 1). The interaction appeared to be 
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driven by both the Democratic and Republican subjects. The main effect of the Democratic 
candidate appearing more trustworthy than the Republican is likely due to the Independents, 
many of whom would be considered Democrats by an objective measure (Appendix E reports 
this analysis using the objective measure; the interaction is still significant, but the main effect of 
candidate political party disappears). Two paired-samples t-tests showed that subjects trusted the 
Democratic candidate more at Debate 1 than after the test, t(125) = 2.63, p = .010, d = 0.14, and 
that they trusted the Republican candidate equally at both times, t = 1.53. 
Did change recollection influence the trust ratings? After the test, the hit rates for the individual 
candidates correlated negatively with the trust ratings for the Republican candidate, r = -.18, p = 
.045, but not for the Democratic candidate, r = -.09, p = .315 (see middle panels of Figure 5). For 
the Republican candidate, a higher hit rate was associated with lower trust ratings, supporting the 
hypothesis that recollecting change led to a decrease in trust. Looking at the change in the trust 
scores between Debate 1 and the test, however, revealed that the hit rate for change recollection 
was correlated with the Democratic candidate, r = -.38, p < .001, but not for the Republican 
candidate, r = -.10, p = .286. The significant negative correlation for the Democratic candidate 
suggests that recollecting change led to the lower trust rating after the test. Taken together, these 
correlations suggest that recollecting change may lead to lower ratings of candidate 
trustworthiness.  
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Figure 3.3: Scatterplots showing correlations between change recollection hit rate and subject 
judgments after the recall test in Experiment 1. * p < .05 
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Likability Ratings. The likability ratings were similar to the trust ratings: the last two columns of 
Table 7 show that subjects liked the candidates from their own party more than the candidates 
from the opposite party. For the Debate 1 ratings, a 3 (subject political orientation) x 2 (candidate 
party) mixed-model ANOVA revealed a main effect of candidate party, F(1, 123) = 38.59, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .24, indicating that the Democratic candidate was liked more than the Republican 
candidate, and a main effect of subject political orientation, F(2, 123) = 7.14, p = .001, ηp2 = .10. 
Post-hoc analyses indicated that the Republican subjects liked both candidates more than the 
Independents did, p = .001. Both main effects, however, were qualified by a significant 
interaction, F(2, 123) = 95.57, p = .001, ηp2 = .61, which suggested that subjects preferred the 
candidates from their own parties. Similarly, for the post-test ratings the Democratic candidate 
was liked more than the Republican candidate, F(1, 123) = 47.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .28, and the 
Republican subjects liked both candidates more than the Independent subjects or the Democratic 
subjects, F(2, 123) = 8.23, p = .001, ηp2 = .12 (ps < .039 for the post-hoc tests). The interaction 
was also significant, F(2, 123) = 79.60, p = .001, ηp2 = .56, indicating that subjects liked the 
candidate from their own party more than the candidate from the opposite party.  
Did likability scores change between Debate 1 and the test? Two paired-samples t-tests showed 
that the subjects liked the Republican less after the test than after Debate 1, t(125) = 2.26, p = 
.025, d = 0.09, but that subjects liked the Democrat similarly at both times, t = 0.74. The change 
recollection hit rate did not correlate with the test likability ratings for the Democrat, r = -.01, p = 
.966, but did marginally correlate with the likability ratings for the Republican, r = -.18, p = 
.050. (see bottom panels of Figure 5). The hit rates for the two candidates did not correlate with 
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the change in likability rating for either candidate, (all ps > .542). Thus, recollecting change may 
have resulted in lower likability ratings for the Republican candidate. 
3.4 Experiment 1 Discussion 
Experiment 1 replicated previous research (Putnam et al., 2014) in showing that recollecting 
change reduced interference: recall for the changed items was worse than the control items 
overall, but conditional analyses revealed that recollecting change eliminated interference. This 
replication is important given the current experiment used a revised set of political materials and 
a different subject population. 
Experiment 1 also addressed whether political orientation affected change recollection or recall. 
A small congeniality effect occurred, suggesting that subjects were better at recalling 
information that was consistent with their own political views. The effect size is small (d = 0.11), 
but consistent with other research on the congeniality effect (Eagly et al., 2001). Unlike recall, 
change recollection appeared to be unaffected by political orientation; it was similar regardless 
of the subject’s or the candidate’s party affiliation. In sum, voters may be better able to 
remember their own candidate’s positions, but are equally capable of remembering past changes 
in position.  
Finally, Experiment 1 also explored whether recollecting change influenced subject perceptions 
of the candidates. Recollecting change was clearly correlated with the estimates of past and 
future change. Both of those estimates were a form of category level judgment (see Jacoby, 
Wahlheim, & Coane, 2010), and a correlation between those estimates and change recollection 
suggests that the category level judgments were driven by the local judgments (e.g., the overall 
rating of past change was influenced by remembering change on specific items). Thus, 
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recollecting change at least influenced how the candidates were perceived in terms of their past 
and future probabilities of changing position. 
In contrast, recollecting change appeared to have a much smaller effect (if any) on voting 
preferences, likability ratings, and trustworthiness ratings. All three measures showed a strong 
interaction at both times indicating that subjects had more positive views of the candidates from 
their own party than the opposite. There were, however, some small indications that subjects did 
update their attitudes towards the candidates after Debate 2. For the Republican candidate 
recollecting change was negatively correlated with likeability and trustworthiness ratings after 
the test. In addition, the Democrat was perceived as less likable after the test than after Debate 1. 
These correlations suggest (albeit in a small way) that recollecting change led to a less positive 
perception of the candidates.  
In sum, Experiment 1 showed that recollecting change reduced interference, that subjects may be 
slightly better at recalling information that is consistent with their own views, and that 
recollecting change may have some small impact on how voters perceive candidates. Experiment 
2 extended the paradigm to examine how voters integrated information from a third party source.
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Chapter 4: Experiment 2 
In the context of a real political campaign, voters are probably more likely to learn about a 
politician changing position from an external source rather than noticing it on their own. For 
example, some websites keep track of when politicians change positions (PolitiFact.com uses the 
categories of no flip, half flip, and full flop). However, as noted in the introduction, flip-flopping 
accusations are not always warranted. Sometimes a politician may be accused of flip-flopping, 
even though his position has remained essentially the same. Experiment 2 explored how third 
party information about a candidate’s behavior affected later change recollection and recall. 
Sometimes the information was accurate, and other times it was misleading. 
Experiment 2 used the same procedure from Experiment 1 with the addition of a “news analysis” 
phase inserted between Debate 2 and the final test. During that phase subjects read statements 
from a “news” source about the consistency of the candidate on a specific position between 
debates. Half of the time the news statements suggested that the candidates had been consistent 
and half of the time suggested that the candidate had changed positions. Thus, sometimes the 
news was accurate (claiming that a candidate changed positions when he did, or claiming that he 
was consistent when he was), and sometimes the news was inaccurate (claiming that a candidate 
changed positions when he did not or claiming that he was consistent when he changed). 
Subjects were warned that the news statements might not be correct and were asked to verify the 
accuracy of each statement by pressing a True, False, or I Don’t Know button. During the recall 
test subjects attempted to recall the Debate 2 positions and completed the standard measure of 
change recollection. 
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From a remindings perspective, verifying the accuracy of the news statement requires 
recollecting change: subjects must think back to the candidate’s actual behavior across the 
debates and decide if he actually changed positions or was consistent (or only addressed the topic 
at Debate 2). Correctly verifying a news statement suggests that subjects were able to remember 
a previously detected change or repetition. In this way, the news verification task is a novel 
measure of change recollection. Rather than occurring simultaneously with a recall test (e.g., 
Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2013) it occurs in separate phase before the memory test. Given that 
previous works suggests that change recollection is highly correlated with earlier change 
detection (Jacoby et al. 2013), measuring change recollection before the recall test should yield 
similar results to measuring change recollection concurrently with recall; recollecting change 
should ameliorate proactive interference for the changed items.  
Additionally, correctly verifying a news statement may provide retrieval practice for recollecting 
change during the final test (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006). Thus, subjects who correctly verify a 
news statement should show increased change recollection accuracy in the future. 
In contrast, failing to accurately verify a news statement suggests that subjects did not have 
access to previous information about the candidate’s behavior. The subject either failed to detect 
a change when it occurred, or having detected it, was unable to recollect it during the news 
phase. Wahlheim and Jacoby (2013) showed that subjects almost never recollect change without 
initially detecting it, so failing to verify a news statement is a strong predictor that subjects will 
not recollect change at the final test. Critically, however, if a news statement is untrue, it may 
also serve as a misinformation–it may suggest that a candidate changed positions when he never 
did (e.g., Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978). A subject who endorses an inaccurate news statement 
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should show poor change recollection at the final test, which should translate to poor recall for 
the changed items. 
Several predictions can be made about Experiment 2. First, the changed items should show 
worse recall compared to control items, but recollecting change should reduce or eliminate that 
proactive interference. This pattern should occur whether the measure of change recollection was 
the news verification task or the standard task during the final test.  
Second, subjects might use the news statements to inform their change recollection judgments at 
the final test. The news statements that suggest a candidate changed positions should lead to 
higher change recollection rates across all item types compared to the news statements that 
suggest a candidate was consistent. This increase would be represented by a higher false alarm 
rate for the repetition and control items (because no change actually occurred) and a higher hit 
rate for the changed items (because there was a change).  
Third, correctly verifying a news statement should lead to accurate change recollection at the 
final test. For the repetition and control items, a correct verification should lead to a low false 
alarm rate and reasonably high levels of recall. For the changed items, a correct verification 
should also lead to a high hit rate for recollecting change, which consequently should lead to 
improved recall. 
In contrast, if subjects are not able to correctly verify a news statement they should show poor 
change recollection accuracy during the final test. This may translate to poor recall for some item 
types. Subjects can fail to make a correct verification in two ways. They can endorse an untrue 
statement (responding True to a flip-flopping claim about a politician who was consistent – a 
misinformation response) or they can fail to verify a true statement (responding False to a flip-
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flopping statement about a politician who changed – a miss response). Both types of errors 
should harm memory, although a misinformation response may have a more extreme effect, 
because subjects would actively be endorsing an untrue statement. These errors should have 
different effects on memory depending on the specific item type. For the repetition items, failing 
to correctly verify a statement should lead to a higher false alarm rate in change recollection, but 
only a minor (if any) decrease in recall (because there is no competing position). For the control 
items, failing to correctly verify a statement should not have a large effect on change 
recollection. The news statements suggest either that a candidate changed positions or was 
consistent–both are untrue for the changed items, but the two statements might have 
contradictory effects on later change recollection. Thus, failing to verify a control statement may 
not have a large impact on change recollection. Likewise, because there is no competing position 
from Debate 1, failing to verify a news statement for a control item should not affect recall. 
Finally, for the changed items, failing to correctly verify a statement should lead to a low change 
recollection rate which in turn should lead to poor recall of the Debate 2 position. Failing to 
verify a statement suggests that subjects were unable to access the recursive trace during the 
news phase, and consequently will be unable to access that trace at the final test. Without the 
ability to accurately recollect change, recall will suffer from proactive interference. 
Finding this predicted pattern of results would be interesting for several reasons.  First, it would 
begin to address the real world question of how third party information, from a news source or 
political pundit, shapes how voters remember a politician’s change in position. Second, the news 
verification task provides a new approach to measuring change recollection. Third, it would also 
suggest that retrieving the experience of being reminded (accessing the recursive trace) facilitates 
future change recollection, showing that covert retrieval practice can enhance the memorability 
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of a recursive trace (Putnam & Roediger, 2013). Finally, if failing to verify the news statements 
results in a poorer discrimination for change recollection, it would suggest that subjects 
incorporate misleading information into their memories, even if they know the source of the 
information is not to be trusted. 
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Subjects 
One hundred subjects from the same pool as Experiment 1 participated. The same 
recruiting strategy was used (having subjects report their political orientation before 
beginning the experiment) to ensure there were 50 Democrats and 50 Republicans; no 
self-reported independents were recruited. Sixteen additional subjects participated, but 
their data were omitted from all analyses: three for failing the instructional manipulation 
check, seven for reporting low levels of political knowledge, and six for failing the 
political expertise quiz. The objective political measure revealed that the sample was 
more liberal than expected from the self-report, with 62 Democrats, 7 Independents, and 
31 Republicans. The average age was 36 (SD = 10.68), with ages ranging from 21 to 73. 
Subjects reported their level of education (9% indicated high school education or less, 
36% indicated some college, and 55% indicated a bachelor’s or graduate degree), which 
state they were in (32 states were represented), and whether they were born in the United 
States (2 were not). Subjects reported a mean political expertise of 61.09 (SD = 22.24) on 
the self-report question and answered an average of 5.4 out of 8 questions on the political 
expertise quiz. 
4.1.2 Design and Procedure 
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The experimental design and procedure was similar to Experiment 1 with the addition of 
a “news” phase that occurred between Debate 2 and the final test. During this phase 
subjects read statements from a fictitious news source that claimed that candidates either 
changed positions or were consistent on individual topics. They were informed that the 
news was sometimes accurate and sometimes inaccurate, and that their job was to verify, 
based on their memories, when the news was accurate. Half of the news reports suggested 
that the candidate changed positions (flip-flop statements, e.g., “Mike Shipman changed 
positions on Same Sex Marriage”); the other half of the news reports suggested that the 
candidate did not change positions (straight statements, e.g., John Baker was consistent 
in his views on Same Sex Marriage”)2. The news statements appeared one at a time in a 
random order along with a picture of the candidate. After 1.5 seconds, subjects were 
asked to respond to the statement by pressing a True, False, or I Don’t Know button, after 
which a blank screen appeared briefly before the next trial began. Subjects were 
instructed to use the I Don’t Know button when there was not enough information to 
know if the candidate changed position or not (i.e., for the control items). Every item was 
presented during the news phase, for a total of 72 presentations. Thus the experiment was 
a 3 (item type: repetition, control, changed) x 2 (news report: straight, flip-flop) design. 
A similar counterbalancing scheme to Experiment 1 was used. The 72 topics were split 
into three groups, with each group assigned to one item type (repetition, control, 
                                                
 
 
2 I am using the flip-flop label for the news phase to avoid confusion with the changed item type and the 
straight label was used to avoid confusion with the repetition item type. 
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changed). Within a group half of the items displayed the strong statement at Debate 2 and 
half displayed the weak statement at Debate 2.  Within the sub-groups, half of the items 
were associated with a flip-flop news statement and the other half were associated with a 
straight news statement. These groups were then rotated across conditions, ensuring that 
each item appeared in every condition equally often across counterbalancing conditions. 
4.2 Results 
Two independent coders marked the cued recall responses and I resolved any 
disagreements between the coders (inter-rater reliability, as measured by Cohen’s Kappa, 
was .74). First I will report the overall cued recall and change recollection results, then 
the results taking the news phase into account. The analyses examining the effects of 
political orientation on recall and change recollection, along with the voting and 
judgment data, are reported in Appendix F. 
4.2.1 Recall and Change Recollection 
Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 in showing a proactive interference. The repetition 
items (M = .56, SEM = .02) led to better recall than the control items (M = .43, SEM = 
.02), which in turn were recalled better than the changed items (M = .32, SEM = .02), 
F(2,198) = 123.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .56. Follow up comparisons revealed that all of the 
differences were significant, ts(99) > 8.08, ps < .001, ds > 0.61. Table 8 shows the change 
recollection rates for the control and changed items, along with d’ and c. Subjects 
successfully recollected change: d’ was greater than zero, t(99) = 8.82, p < .001, d = 0.88. 
Accuracy in change recollection was lower in Experiment 2 (d’ = 0.52) than in 
Experiment 1 (d’ = 0.86), t(224) = 3.53, p < .001, d = 0.49, likely because of the 
misleading news statements. 
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Table 4.1: Probabilities of Change Recollection and Signal Detection Measures in 
Experiment 2 
 Item Type  SDT Measure 
 Control (FAs) Changed (Hits)  d’ c 
Experiment 2      
Mean .17 .32  0.52 0.87 
SEM .02 .02  0.06 0.06 
 
4.2.2 Recall Conditionalized on Change Recollection 
Figure 6 shows that conditionalizing recall for the changed items on change recollection 
replicated Experiment 1. When subjects did not recollect change, recall was worse for the 
changed items than it was for the control items, t(99) = 10.48, p < .001, d = 1.18. But 
when subjects did recollect change, recall for the changed items was equal to the control 
items, t(90) = 1.28, p = .206, d = 0.14, showing that recollecting change eliminated 
proactive interference.  
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Figure 4.1: Cued recall for the changed positions conditionalized on change recollection, as 
compared to the control condition, Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard error of the 
means. 
 
Table 9 displays two hierarchical regression analyses exploring item and subject effects 
conducted in the same fashion as in Experiment 1. The left column shows that item differences 
explained a large portion of variance in predicting recall of the change items. Change 
recollection had a mariginally significant contribution, explaining a small proportion of variance. 
The interaction was not significant. The right column shows that subject differences contributed 
to the recall of the control items, but that change recollection explained additional variance after 
controlling for subject differences. Again, the interaction was not significant. The inclusion of 
the news phase (which affected change recollection) makes it difficult to directly compare  
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Experiment 2 to Experiment 1. However, the results of these regression analyses suggested that 
change recollection did make a unique contribution to recall of the changed items. 
Table 4.2: Proportion of Variance in Recall of Changed Positions Explained by Item 
Differences, General Memory Ability, and Change Recollection in Experiment 2. 
 Unit of Analysis 
 Items Subjects 
Step 1   
Item Differences / General Memory .37 (p < .001) .48 (p < .001) 
Step 2   
Change Recollection (Hits - FA) .02 (p = .058) .05 (p = .001) 
Step 3   
Interaction .003 (p = .971) .007 (p = .227) 
Note: Values displayed above are ∆R2 on each step of the model computed at the item level 
collapsed across subjects (left) and at the subject level collapsed across items (right). “Item 
Differences” refers to item differences in control position recall performance, “General Memory” 
refers to individual differences in control position recall performance, and “Change Recollection 
(Hits - FA)” refers to individual differences in discriminability of change recollection for changed 
positions. 
 
4.2.3 News Phase Responses 
During the news phase subjects saw straight statements (suggesting a candidate had been 
consistent, e.g., Mike Shipman was consistent in his views on Same Sex Marriage) and 
flip-flop statements (suggesting a candidate had changed positions, e.g., John Baker 
changed positions on Same Sex Marriage), and were asked to push one of three buttons –
True, False, or I Don’t Know–based on their memory of the candidate’s past behavior. 
Table 10 shows the mean proportion of each response for the different item types and the 
different news statements. Across all item types (this mean is not shown in Table 10) 
subjects were more likely to endorse the straight news statements as true (M = .70, SEM 
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= .02) rather than false (M = .18, SEM = .01), t(99) = 18.44, p < .001, d = 3.42, and more 
likely to endorse the flip-flop statements as false (M = .70, SEM = .02) rather than true (M 
= .17, SEM = .02), t(99) = 18.74, p = .001, d = 3.43. Subjects were equally likely to use 
the I Don’t Know response for both types of news statements, t < 1. This pattern suggests 
that subjects believed candidates were often consistent between debates despite the news 
claiming otherwise and the candidates actually changing positions on some topics. 
 
Table 4.3: Mean Proportion of Each Type of Response on the News Verification Task 
Organized by Item Type and News Statement Type in Experiment 2 
  Subject Response 
Item Type & News Statement  True False I Don’t Know 
Repetition     
News: Straight  .82 (.02) .11 (.01) .07 (.01) 
News: Flip-flop  .10 (.01) .82 (.01) .08 (.01) 
Control     
News: Straight  .62 (.02) .15 (.01) .23 (.02) 
News: Flip-flop  .12 (.01) .65 (.03) .23 (.02) 
Changed     
News: Straight  .65 (.02) .27 (.02) .08 (.01) 
News: Flip-flop  .28 (.02) .63 (.02) .09 (.01) 
 
 
A more interesting analysis, however, is examining how accurate subjects were in the 
news verification task. For the news phase, subject responses were grouped into one of 
three bins correct, misinformation, or miss. Correct responses were when subjects 
accurately verified a news statement. These were indexed as follows: for the repetition 
items, responding True to a straight statement or False to a flip-flop statement; for the 
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control items, responding I Don’t Know to both the straight and the flip-flop statements; 
and for the changed items, responding False to a straight statement and True to a flip-flop 
statement. Misinformation responses were when subjects actively endorsed an untrue 
statement. These were indexed as follows: for the repetition items, responding True to a 
flip-flop statement; for the control items, responding True to either a straight or a flip-
flop statement; and for the changed items, responding True to a straight statement. 
Finally, miss responses were when subjects did not accurately verify a statement, but also 
did not endorse an untrue statement. These were indexed as: responding False to a 
straight statement about a repetition item; responding False to a flip-flop statement about 
a changed item; responding False to any statement about a control item; or responding 
with I Don’t Know to any statement about a repetition or changed item.  
Figure 7 shows the response rates for the different item types. The left panel shows the 
correct response rate. A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA with item type as the 
independent variable revealed a significant effect, F(2, 198) = 322.97, p = .001, ηp2 = .77. 
Subjects had the highest correct verification rate for the repetition items, a lower rate for 
the changed items, and the lowest rate for the control items, all ts(99) > 2.15, ps < .034, 
ds > 0.25. A second one-way repeated measures ANOVA with the misinformation 
responses as the dependent variable (see middle panel) also revealed a significant effect, 
F(2, 198) = 305.75, p = .001, ηp2 = .76. Subjects had the highest misleading endorsement 
rate for the control items, a slightly lower rate for the changed items, and the lowest rate 
for the repetition items, all ts(99) > 3.78, ps < .001, ds > 0.43. The high misinformation 
endorsement rate for the control items is likely because responding True to a straight 
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Figure 4.2: The correct verification, misleading endorsement, and miss response rates for the 
news statements during Experiment 2. See the main text for descriptions of how responses were 
indexed. 
 
or a flip-flop statement would be considered a misinformation response for a control item, 
meaning there are two possible ways to make a misleading endorsement. In contrast, for the 
repetition and changed items there was only one way to make a misleading endorsement–
responding True to a statement that was inconsistent with the item type. Finally, a third one-way 
repeated measures ANOVA with the miss responses as the dependent variable (see right panel) 
revealed a significant effect, F(2,198) = 177.08, p < .001, ηp2 = .64. Subjects were less likely to 
make a miss response for the repetition items compared to the control or changed items, ts(99) > 
14.47, ps < .001, ds > 2.14, but were equally likely to make a miss response for the control and 
changed items, t < 1. 
In sum, during the news phase subjects had a strong tendency to remember all of the statements 
as being consistent, regardless of whether they actually were. Subjects were incredibly accurate 
for the repetition items, showing a high correct endorsement rate and a low misleading 
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endorsement rate, but were less accurate for the control and changed items. The next section 
explores how the news statements influenced later recall and change recollection. 
4.2.4 Did the News Statements Influence Recall and Change Recollection? 
How did the two types of news statements affect later recall and change recollection? Figure 8 
shows recall as a function of item type and news statement. A 3 (item type: repetition, control, 
changed) x 2 (news statement: straight, flip-flop) within-subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect 
of item type, F(2, 198) = 123.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .57, but did not reveal a main effect of news 
statement or a significant interaction (both Fs < 1.64). This was surprising–one might expect a 
significant interaction where news statements that suggested untrue information (e.g., a straight 
statement for a changed item) would lead to worse recall than an accurate news statement. To 
confirm that no such pattern existed, I compared recall after an accurate news statement (straight 
statements about repetition items and flip-flop statements about changed items; M = .45, SEM = 
.02) to recall after an inaccurate news statement (flip-flop statements about repetition items and 
straight statements about changed items; M = .43, SEM=.02), but  failed to reveal a significant 
difference, t(99) = 1.27, p = .208, d = 0.11. In short, the flip-flop and straight news statements 
did not influence recall, either as a main effect or as an interaction with item type.  
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Figure 4.3: Probability of recall in Experiment 2 as a function of item type and news statement 
type. 
 
 In contrast, the news statements did affect change recollection. Table 11 shows the change 
recollection rates for the three different item types. A 3 (item type: repetition, control, changed) x 
2 (news statement: straight, flip-flop) within-subjects ANOVA with change recollection as the 
dependent variable (and Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment for a violation of sphericity) revealed a 
main effect of news, F(1, 99) = 7.78, p = .006, ηp2 = .07, indicating that across item types change 
recollection was higher after a flip-flop news statement (M = .21, SEM = .02) than after a straight 
news statement (M = .19, SEM = .01). The effect size is small, but this difference makes sense–
after all, the flip-flop statements are suggested that the candidate changed positions. There was 
also a main effect of item type, F(1.45, 143.72) = 89.06, p = .001, ηp2 = .47, with post-hoc tests 
revealing that change recollection was highest for the changed items, lowest for the repetition 
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items, in between for the control items (all ps < .001). The interaction was marginally significant, 
F(1.89, 186.62) = 2.46, p = .092, ηp2 = .02. Change recollection accuracy (measured by d’) was 
numerically higher for the flip-flop statements than the straight statements, but this difference did 
not reach significance, t = 1.57. Likewise, the difference in c between the flip-flop and straight 
statements was not significant, t = 1.37. 
Table 4.4: Probabilities of Change Recollection and Signal Detection Measures in 
Experiment 2, Broken Down by News Statement Accuracy. 
 Item Type  SDT Measure 
News Statement Repetition Control 
(FAs) 
Changed  
(Hits)  
d’ c 
Straight .10 (.01) .17 (.02) .30 (.02) 
 
0.46 (0.07) 0.91 (0.07) 
Flip-flop .12 (.01) .17 (.02) .34 (.03) 
 
0.59 (0.08) 0.86 (0.07) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses represent standard error. 
In sum, the news statements did not influence recall, but did influence change recollection. In 
particular, the flip-flop news statements made it more likely that subjects would report 
recollecting change at the final test for all item types (although looking at Table 11 suggests this 
effect is driven only by the repetition and changed items). This outcome can be thought of as a 
criterion shift – seeing an item tagged with a flip-flop statement increased the likelihood that 
subjects would remember change at the final test. C did not show a difference between the two 
conditions because only control items were used as false alarms in calculating c.  
4.2.5 Did News Phase Accuracy Influence Later Recall and Change 
Recollection? 
The main hypothesis for Experiment 2 was that correct verifications during the news phase 
would lead to accurate recall and change recollection during the final test. Figure 9 shows recall 
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for the different item types conditionalized on subject responses during the news phase. 
Responses were grouped into correct and incorrect bins (the misinformation and miss responses 
led to similar effects on recall, so those two types of response were grouped together for this 
analysis – see Appendix F for details). A 3 (item type: repetition, changed, control) x 2 (news 
verification response: correct, incorrect) within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA revealed a 
main effect of item type, F(2, 144) = 33.56, p < .001, ηp2 = .32, a main effect of news response 
accuracy, F(1, 72) = 15.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .17, and most importantly, a significant interaction, 
F(2, 144) = 4.07, p = .019, ηp2 = .05. Simple effects analysis revealed that the interaction was 
driven mostly by the changed items: recall was roughly similar for the repetition and control 
items regardless of whether the news phase verification was correct or incorrect, t(53) = 1.04, p = 
.30 and t(79) = 0.46, p = .65 respectively, but recall for the changed items was better after a 
correct verification than an incorrect verification, t(94) = 3.40, p < .001, d = 0.45 (the differences 
in degrees of freedom were due to some subjects not having an observation in every cell). Thus, 
it appears that correctly responding during the news phase led to more accurate recall for the 
changed items, but not for the repetition or control items. This outcome fits with the initial 
predictions. A correct news verification suggests that subjects had access to a recursive trace and 
were able to accurately recollect change. For the changed items, this means subjects can recollect 
change to overcome any competition from the Debate 1 position and show a reduction in 
interference (as shown). For the repetition and control items, however, recollecting change is less 
important for recall, because there is no competing response. 
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Figure 4.4: Recall by item type conditionalized on news phase verification accuracy. 
 
News verification accuracy also influenced change recollection. Table 12 shows the change 
recollection rates for the different item types along with signal detection measures 
conditionalized on whether subjects were correct or incorrect in their news verification (see 
Appendix F for an analysis that breaks that the incorrect responses into misinformation 
endorsements and misses). A 3 (item type: repetition, control, changed) x 2 (news verification 
response: correct, incorrect) within-subjects ANOVA with change recollection as the dependent 
variable revealed a main effect of item type F(2, 144) = 91.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .56, a main effect 
of news accuracy, F(1, 72) = 22.23, p < .001, ηp2 = .24, and a significant interaction, F(2, 144) = 
68.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .49. Breaking down the interaction revealed that for the repetition items, 
change recollection was lower after a correct than incorrect news response, t(94) = 3.37, p < 
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.001, d = 0.43, that for the control items change recollection was similar after a correct or 
incorrect response, t = 1.28, and that for the changed items, change recollection was higher after 
an correct response than an incorrect response, t(94) = 10.60, p < .001, d = 1.14. Thus, accurately 
verifying a news statement led to a decrease in erroneous change recollection for the repetition 
items, an increase in accurate change recollection for the changed items, and no difference for 
the control items. This difference translated to more accurate change recollection, as measured 
by d’, after a correct news verification than an incorrect news verification, t(74) = 7.82, p < .001, 
d = 1.19. This outcome suggests that correctly verifying a statement about a candidate’s past 
behavior allowed subjects to more accurately recollect change in the future.  
Table 4.5: Probabilities of Change Recollection and Signal Detection Measures in Experiment 2, 
Broken Down by News Verification Accuracy  
 Item Type  SDT Measure 
News Verification 
Response 
Repetition Control 
(FAs) 
Changed (Hits) 
 d’ c 
Correct .09 (.01) .17 (.03) .54 (.03)  1.47 (0.16) 0.44 (0.09) 
Incorrect .17 (.02) .18 (.02) .23 (.02)  0.22 (0.05) 0.99 (0.06) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses represent standard error. 
4.3 Discussion 
Experiment 2 was inspired by the real world question of whether a news organization can cause 
voters to misremember whether a candidate changed positions. There are several outcomes worth 
noting. First, Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 in showing that proactive interference 
occurred, but that recollecting change eliminated that interference effect. This finding was 
expected based on prior studies (e.g., Putnam et al., 2014; Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2013). In 
addition, Appendix F reports additional analyses examining the effects of partisanship on recall 
and change recollection along with measures of subject attitudes towards the candidates. In 
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general, the findings from Experiment 1 were replicated, although some small differences did 
occur. 
Second, during the news verification task, subjects tended to remember the candidates as being 
consistent on most positions (see Table 10). They labeled a majority of the straight statements as 
true (regardless of item type) and labeled a majority of the flip-flop statements as false 
(regardless of item type). As a result, subjects were incredibly accurate in verifying the repetition 
items, and less so for the control and changed items. The tendency to remember items as 
consistent may have emerged because the candidates only changed positions on 1/3 of the items. 
So as a general rule of thumb it may have been advantageous for subjects to assume that the 
candidates were consistent during the news phase.  
Third, the two different types of news statements (straight and flip-flop) did not influence later 
recall, but did have a small effect on change recollection. Subjects were more likely to remember 
change for an item following a flip-flop statement than a straight statement. This pattern can be 
interpreted as a misinformation effect (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978). A subject sees an event, 
(a candidate changing positions) is exposed to some misleading information, (a news statement 
saying the candidate was consistent) and then is less likely to recollect change than if no 
misinformation had been presented. However, the effect is small, and may be driven largely by 
the changed items.   
The fourth and most important result is the conditional analysis showing that subject responses to 
the news verification task influenced later recall and change recollection. As predicted, a correct 
verification during the news phase (compared to an incorrect verification) led to slightly higher 
recall for the repetition items (a numerical, but not significant difference), no difference for the 
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control items, and higher recall for the changed items (a significant difference). In addition, a 
correct verification during the news phase also led to increased change recollection accuracy. 
After a correct verification subjects had lower erroneous change recollection for repetition items 
and higher accurate change recollection for the changed items.  
The results with both change recollection and recall are consistent with the recursive remindings 
framework. Correctly verifying the news statement required accessing a previous memory of 
change (or lack of it, depending on the item type). Another way to interpret Figure 9 (which 
shows recall conditionalized on news verification accuracy) is to think of the news verification 
responses as a measure of change recollection; rather than happening concurrently with recall, it 
occurred in a separate phase before the recall test. From this perspective, the recall results for the 
changed items in Figure 9 are remarkably similar to those shown in Figure 6, which uses the 
direct measure of change recollection: remembering that a change occurred lead to a decrease in 
proactive interference. 
Previous work has shown that change detection is often correlated with later change recollection 
(Putnam et al. 2014) and that it is rare for subjects to recollect change without previously 
detecting it (Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2013). Given that the news verification task requires 
recollecting change, it is not surprising that accuracy here predicted future change recollection. 
Furthermore, recollecting change once may serve as retrieval practice for the change recollection 
measure at the final test (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006). One puzzle is why change recollection for 
the control items was similar regardless of whether the news verification was accurate or 
inaccurate. One possibility is that for the control items, responding True or False to either a 
straight or a flip-flop statement would be considered incorrect. Because subjects had a tendency 
to verify straight statements as true and reject flip-flop statements as false, these endorsements 
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for the control items are encouraging subjects to think of the control statements as repetition 
items, which may have reduced change recollection at the final test.  
 In sum, Experiment 2 showed that third party information from a news source can have a small 
impact on how subjects remember change. Although the statements on their own do not have a 
large impact on change recollection and recall, subjects who are able to verify the accuracy of 
those statements show better change recollection at the final test and increased recall for the 
changed items. The general concept fits with other work (Loftus, 1979; Putnam & Roediger, 
2015) that shows that misinformation effects may not occur if subjects notice and remember the 
inconsistency between the original event and the misinformation. One issue to be aware of in 
Experiment 2 (and in Experiment 3) is that the news statements do affect the change recollection 
rate. As a result, the main analyses that rely on conditional analyses may be less sensitive, 
because change recollection is less accurate. Experiment 3 explores another way to manipulate 
change recollection – but rather than coming from a third party such as a news group, it comes 
from the candidates themselves. 
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Chapter 5: Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 explored whether politicians can use specific language to make it more likely that 
someone would remember a change in position, and whether such language could affect later 
recall. The same overall design, materials, and procedure from Experiment 1 were used except 
that during Debate 2, each position statement was presented along with an introductory phrase. 
Some of the introductory phrases were neutral (e.g., “My stance on this topic is that…”) whereas 
other phrases encouraged subjects to think back to the first debate by suggesting change (e.g., “In 
the past I may have said something else, but I will argue that…”). The hypothesis was that the 
latter type of phrase (a looking back phrase) would encourage subjects to think back to Debate 1. 
In other words, the looking back statements might encourage covert change detection. Such a 
task may lead to more accurate change recollection at the final test, which would translate to 
better recall for the changed items. 
This prediction is drawn from previous work that has shown different instructions can encourage 
the degree to which subjects look book to previous events, and that such instructions can impact 
later memory performance. For example, Putnam et al. (2014, Experiment 3) included an explicit 
measure of change detection in an experiment that used the political materials. During Debate 2 
subjects were asked to push a button when they noticed that an item had changed from Debate 1. 
Including this change detection task led to more accurate change recollection at the final test 
which in turn led to proactive facilitation for the changed items (see right panel of Figure 1). 
Putnam et al. suggested that the explicit change detection task increased the likelihood that 
subjects would be reminded of a previous event, and that detecting change would lead to more 
accurate change recollection. 
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Although Hintzman (2004; 2011) has argued that most remindings are automatic, other work 
(Jacoby & Wahlheim, 2013; Jacoby et al., in press; Wahlheim et al., 2014) has shown that 
different instructions can encourage the degree to which subjects look back to previous events. In 
one experiment, for example, Wahlheim et al. (2014) showed that subjects who were instructed 
to notice repetitions between lists showed higher cued recall performance on pairs that were 
repeated across lists than subjects who were only instructed to notice repetitions within a list. 
Thus, different instructions may encourage the degree to which subjects engage in remindings.  
In the current experiment, the looking back phrases may cue subjects to think back to the Debate 
1 positions. Doing so should cause the Debate 1 position to become embedded in memory with 
the Debate 2 position, and accessing that recursive trace at the final test should lead to enhanced 
recall for the changed items. More specifically, the looking back phrases should lead to more 
accurate change recollection (both a decrease in the false alarm rate and an increase in the hit 
rate) compared to the neutral phrases. In addition, the looking back statements should lead to 
higher recall for the changed items compared to the neutral statements (recall for the control and 
repetition items should remain unaffected by the looking back phrases).  
One caveat, however, is that previous research showing that instructions can influence 
remindings has exclusively used between-subjects manipulations (Jacoby & Wahlheim, 2013; 
Jacoby et al., in press; Wahlheim et al., 2014), whereas the current experiment uses a within-
subjects manipulation. Will looking back cues work in a within-subjects design? Carryover 
effects are a concern here. Indeed, Loftus (1979) conducted a misinformation experiment where 
there was one blatant piece of misinformation (a bold inconsistency that everyone noticed) and 
four smaller pieces of information. Subjects never showed a misinformation effect for the blatant 
item (the argument being the change was so obvious people were able to reject it), but more 
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importantly, once subjects noticed the blatant misinformation, they were much more likely to 
notice the other pieces of misinformation. Thus, in the current experiment, the looking back 
statements may not lead to increased change recollection accuracy because subjects could be 
looking back to Debate 1 for the neutral items as well.  
A related concern is that the looking back statements might not cue subjects to look back at all. 
Remindings occur spontaneously, but as noted above, can be encouraged through different types 
of instructions (see also Benjamin & Ross, 2010 for the role of remindings in transfer tasks), 
which suggests that the looking back statements might be effective. If, however, the looking 
back statements do not encourage remindings, then subjects may show a higher change 
recollection rate for all item types, because they would be using the information from the looking 
back phrase to inform their change recollection judgment. For the repetition and control items, 
this higher rate would be erroneous (because there was no change), meaning the looking back 
statements would be serving as misinformation. 
Finally, one last concern is that subjects may not attend to the introductory phrases. To check 
whether subjects processed the looking back statements I conducted two pilot experiments 
(reported in more detail in Appendix G). The first pilot (3A) used the same design from 
Experiment 3, but included a change detection task during Debate 2 (subjects pushed a button 
when they notice a position had changed) and omitted the final test. The second pilot (3B) also 
used the same design from Experiment 3, but the final test was just the change recollection 
judgment (subjects did not do the cued recall task). The results from both experiments suggested 
that subjects did process the looking back tasks: change detection in pilot 3A and change 
recollection in 3B were both reliably greater in the looking back condition than the neutral 
condition. However, accuracy in change detection and change recollection was similar for both 
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the looking back and neutral statements. Thus, subjects may attend to the introductory phrases, 
but it may not lead to more accurate change recollection at the final test.  
5.1 Method 
5.1.1 Subjects 
Fifty workers from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website participated. Thirteen additional subjects 
participated, but their data were omitted from all analyses: one for failing the instructional 
manipulation check, four for reporting low levels of political knowledge, seven for failing the 
political expertise quiz, and one for submitting the same response to every question. The pilot 
studies indicated that the looking back statements may increase erroneous change recollection, 
which would have made it difficult to interpret any correlations between change recollection and 
attitudes towards the candidates. As such, the candidate attitude questions were omitted from 
Experiment 3, meaning subjects were not recruited based on political orientation (hence the 
smaller sample size).  
Thirty-one of the subjects were self-reported Democrats, eighteen were independents, and one 
was a Republican. The objective political measure revealed the sample to have 42 Democrats, 
three independents, and five Republicans. The average age was 34 (SD = 9.14) with ages ranging 
from 19 to 58. Subjects reported their level of education (10% indicated high school education or 
less, 38% indicated some college, and 52% indicated a bachelor’s or graduate degree) and which 
state they were in (25 states were represented). Subjects reported a mean political expertise of 
58.02 (SD = 23.25) on the self-report question and answered an average of 5.4 out of 8 questions 
on the political expertise quiz. All subjects were born in the U.S. 
5.1.2 Design, Procedure, and Materials 
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The basic design, materials, and procedure from Experiment 1 were used with two differences. 
First, in interest of simplicity the voting and judgment measures were omitted from Experiment 
3. After completing Debate 1 subjects moved straight to the distractor task, and after the recall 
test moved straight to the measurements of political orientation and expertise.  
Second, during Debate 2 each statement was presented along with an introductory phrase. There 
were two types of phrases. One type was the neutral phrases, which were essentially verbal filler. 
For example, here is a neutral phrase paired with a statement about same sex marriage: “I’m glad 
this topic came up today; partners of the same sex should be recognized through marriage.” The 
other type was the looking back phrases that encouraged subjects to look back to Debate 1 by 
implying change. Here is a looking back phrase paired with the same statement: “In contrast to 
my previous position, I now believe that partners of the same sex should be recognized through 
marriage.” There were six different neutral phrases and six different looking back phrases.   
The experiment was a 3 x 2 within-subjects design with item type (repetition, control, changed) 
crossed with introductory phrase type (neutral, looking back). A similar counterbalancing 
scheme to Experiment 2 was used. The 36 topics were split into three different groups (12 
topics/group) and rotated through the different item types across subjects. Within each group half 
of the items presented the strong statement at Debate 2 and the other half presented the weak 
statement. Within each sub-group, half of the statements were paired with a neutral phrase, and 
half were paired with a looking back phrase. Each item appeared in each condition equally often 
across counterbalancing assignments.  
5.2 Results 
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Responses were coded by two independent raters (Cohen’s Kappa = .75), and I resolved any 
disagreements in coding. First I report the basic recall, change recollection, and conditionalized 
analyses, and then the results that take the introductory phrases into account. 
5.2.1 Recall and Change Recollection 
As expected, the repetition items (M = .56, SEM = .03) led to better recall than the control items 
(M = .49, SEM = .03), which in turn were better than the changed items (M = .39, SEM = .03), 
F(2,98) = 29.53, p < .001, ηp2 = .38. Follow up comparisons revealed that all of the differences 
were significant, ts(49) > 3.23, ps < .001, ds > 0.51. Table 13 shows change recollection for the 
control and changed items, along with the signal detection measures of d’ and c. Subjects 
accurately recollected change: d’ was greater than zero, t(49) = 6.27, p = .001, d = 0.89. Change 
recollection in Experiment 3 (d’ = 0.59) was similar to Experiment 2 (d’ = 0.52), t < 1. 
Table 5.1: Probabilities of Change Recollection and Signal Detection Measures in Experiment 3 
 Item Type  SDT Measure 
 Control (FAs) Changed (Hits)  d’ c 
Experiment 3      
Mean .25 .41  0.59 0.55 
SEM .03 .03  0.09 0.09 
 
5.2.2 Recall Conditionalized on Change Recollection 
Figure 10 shows that conditionalizing recall for the changed items on change recollection 
replicated Experiments 1 and 2. When subjects did not recollect change, recall was worse 
for the changed items than it was for the control items, t(49) = 7.40, p < .001, d = 1.18. 
But when subjects did recollect change, recall for the changed items was equal to the 
control items, t(49) = 1.37, p = .177, d = 0.16, showing that recollecting change 
eliminated proactive interference.  
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Figure 5.1: Cued recall for the changed positions conditionalized on change recollection, as 
compared to the control condition, Experiment 3. Error bars represent standard error of the 
means. 
 
Table 14 shows the results of two hierarchical linear regression analyses done to examine 
whether change recollection had any effects above item and subject differences. The left column 
shows that item differences explained a significant proportion of variance. Change recollection 
and the interaction however, did not explain additional variance. This is a departure from 
previous experiments where change recollection did contribute to recall of the changed items 
above any item effects. One difference between Experiment 3 and the previous experiments is 
the inclusion of the looking back phrases, which may have increased erroneous change 
recollection (which would be reflected in the hits-false alarms rate). The right column of Table 
14 shows that subject memory ability explained a significant proportion of variance and that 
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change recollection explained additional variance. The interaction did not improve performance. 
Thus, change recollection contributed to the recall of the changed items above any individual 
subject differences in memory ability. 
Table 5.2: Proportion of Variance in Recall of Changed Positions Explained by Item 
Differences, General Memory Ability, and Change Recollection in Experiment 3. 
 Unit of Analysis 
 Items Subjects 
Step 1   
Item Differences / General Memory .29 (p < .001) .33 (p < .001) 
Step 2   
Change Recollection (Hits - FA) .01 (p = .301) .10 (p = .007) 
Step 3   
Interaction .002 (p = .502) .008 (p = .421) 
Note: Values displayed above are ∆R2 on each step of the model computed at the item level 
collapsed across subjects (left) and at the subject level collapsed across items (right). “Item 
Differences” refers to item differences in control position recall performance, “General Memory” 
refers to individual differences in control position recall performance, and “Change Recollection 
(Hits - FA)” refers to individual differences in discriminability of change recollection for 
changed positions. 
 
 
5.2.3 Recall as a Function of Introductory Phrase 
Did the introductory phrases in Debate 2 affect recall during the final test? Figure 11 shows 
recall as a function of item type and introductory phrase type. A 3 (item type: repetition, control, 
changed) x 2 (introductory phrase type: neutral, looking back) repeated measures ANOVA with 
recall as the dependent variable revealed a main effect of item type, F(2, 98) = 29.30, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .37, and a main effect of introductory phrase, F(1, 49) = 5.67, p = .021, ηp2 = .10. 
Surprisingly, for the main effect of introductory phrase, recall was higher in the neutral condition 
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(M = .50, SEM = .03) than in the looking back condition (M = .46, SEM = .03). The interaction 
was not significant, F < 1.  
 
 
Figure 5.2: Probability of recall in Experiment 3 as a function of item type and introductory phrase type. 
 
 
5.2.4 Change Recollection as a Function of Introductory Phrase 
Did the introductory phrases influence the overall change recollection rates or change 
recollection accuracy? Table 15 shows change recollection broken down by item type and 
introductory phrase type. A 3 (item type: repetition, control, changed) x 2 (introductory phrase 
type: neutral, looking back) repeated measures ANOVA with change recollection as the 
dependent variable revealed a main effect of item type, F(2, 98) = 47.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .49. 
Collapsing across introductory phrase type, post-hoc analyses revealed that the repetition items 
led to the lowest change recollection rate, followed by the control items, with changed items 
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leading to the highest change recollection rate (all ps < .001). There was also a main effect of 
introductory phrase, F(1, 49) = 5.57, p = .022, ηp2 = .10, indicating that change recollection was 
higher in the looking back condition (M = .30, SEM = .03) than the neutral condition (M = .26, 
SEM = .03. The interaction was not significant, F = 1.45. 
 
Table 5.3: Probabilities of Change Recollection and Signal Detection Measures in Experiment 3, 
Broken Down by Introductory Phrase Type 
 Item Type  SDT Measure 
Introductory Phrase Type Repetition 
Control 
(FAs) 
Changed 
(Hits) 
 
d’ c 
Neutral .15 (.02) .23 (.03) .41 (.03)  0.61 (0.10) 0.61 (0.10) 
Looking Back .21 (.03) .27 (.04) .42 (.03)  0.59 (0.13) 0.54 (0.10) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses represent standard error. 
 
Perhaps the most important analysis in Experiment 3 was whether change recollection accuracy 
was better in the looking back condition than the neutral condition. Both conditions, however, 
had similar change recollection accuracy as measured by d’, t(49) = 0.19, p = .848. C was similar 
in both conditions as well, t = 1.01. Thus, it appears that the looking back statements did not lead 
to more accurate change recollection. 
5.3 Discussion 
The main question in Experiment 3 was whether the introductory phrases would affect later 
change recollection and recall. Overall, Experiment 3 replicated the main results seen in previous 
experiments: interference occurred, but recollecting change reduced that interference. The 
introductory phrases did influence change recollection and recall, but not quite as predicted. 
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First, across all item types the neutral statements led to better recall than the looking back 
statements. However, an interaction was predicted. If the looking back statements really 
encouraged subjects to think back to the Debate 1 positions (leading to covert change detection), 
then it should have led to higher recall for the changed items because subjects would have had 
more accurate change recollection. In contrast, the looking back statements should not have had 
an effect on recall for the control items (because there was nothing to look back to) and should 
have either enhanced recall or had no effect for the repetition items (a looking back statement, 
even though it implied change, may still have caused subjects to notice the repetition, which 
could lead to a benefit to recall regardless of change recollection). Instead, what occurred is an 
advantage in recall for the statements paired with the neutral statements over the looking back 
statements. One explanation for why this occurred is that–as discussed in more detail below–the 
looking back statements increased change recollection across all item types. Thus subjects may 
have been trying to remember changed statements (for the repetition and control items) that did 
not actually exist. 
Similarly, the introductory phrases influenced change recollection, but not as predicted. One 
hypothesis, drawn from previous work showing that instructions could influence remindings 
(Jacoby & Wahlheim, 2013; Jacoby et al., in press; Wahlheim et al., 2014), was that the looking 
back statements would encourage subjects to think back to Debate 1 to confirm that the 
candidate actually changed. Doing so would lead to an increase in accurate change recollection 
for the changed items, and a decrease in erroneous change recollection for the control items and 
especially the repetition items, because looking back would confirm the repetition (even if the 
looking back statement suggested change). However, this pattern did not occur. Instead, the 
results showed that change recollection accuracy was similar in the neutral and looking back 
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conditions. The introductory statements did influence change recollection, but as a main effect – 
change recollection was higher after the looking back statements than the neutral statements. 
Although there was not a significant interaction between the introductory statements and the item 
types on change recollection, examining Table 15 clearly shows that the repetition and control 
items are driving the increase in change recollection. Thus, the looking back statements may only 
be increasing erroneous change recollection.  
The looking back statements did not have the expected effect of encouraging contact with the 
Debate 1 positions. Instead, it appears that the looking back statements led to an increase in 
change recollection across all item types, but primarily as in increase in erroneous change 
recollection for the repetition and control items. Instead of looking back to Debate 1, subjects 
were using the suggestion of change to inform their change recollection judgments. In other 
words, subjects trusted the politicians when they said they changed positions. For the repetition 
and control items, the looking back phrases served as misinformation. Granted, in the real world, 
a political would never claim to change positions when they were consistent. 
If the looking back statements led to higher levels of change recollection, why did this not 
translate to increased recall for the changed items? Examining Table 15 reveals that the change 
recollection rate for the changed items was similar for the neutral and looking back conditions. 
Even if change recollection was higher in the looking back condition it may not translate to 
increased recall for the changed items, because the recollection of change might be artificially 
inflated. A subject who claims to remember change could actually be recollecting it, or he could 
be responding based on the suggestion of change from the looking back statements. Thus, an 
increased changed recollection rate would not necessarily translate to higher recall for the 
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changed items because the measure of change recollection would not represent true change 
recollection. 
Chapter 6: General Discussion 
This dissertation explored proactive interference with realistic political materials.  Three 
experiments confirmed earlier work in showing that it is more to difficult to remember a 
politician’s most recent position if he recently changed positions on that issue–but that the 
difficulty in remembering can be reduced or eliminated if people recollect that a change 
occurred. This result is consistent with a recursive remindings framework that suggests that 
noticing and remembering change through remindings can reduce interference (e.g., Jacoby et 
al., in press). In addition, the three experiments addressed other questions. By using a politically 
diverse sample, Experiment 1 showed that political orientation had only a small (if any) effect on 
recall and no effect on change recollection. Experiment 1 also showed that subjects generally 
trusted, liked, and voted for the candidates from their own political party, but that remembering 
change (i.e., flip-flops) may lead to a more negative attitude towards those candidates. 
Experiment 2 showed that third party information (such as a news report) can influence people’s 
ability to remember change–but only if people do not notice inconsistent statements. Accurately 
verifying news statements, by endorsing true ones and rejecting false ones, led to more accurate 
change recollection at the final test which in turn led to increased recall for the instances where 
candidates actually changed positions. Finally, Experiment 3 explored whether politicians can 
use specific language to influence a voter’s ability to remember change. Claiming to change 
positions did not increase change recollection accuracy, as predicted, but rather served as a 
source of misleading information, biasing subjects to remember change even if no such change 
occurred. 
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In the remainder of the discussion I will discuss the theoretical implications of these experiments 
for the recursive remindings framework, the misinformation effect, and the relationship between 
memory and attitudes. In doing so I will suggest a few directions for future research. Then, I will 
note a few limitations of the current research and close with some suggestions for applications to 
politics. 
6.1 Theoretical Implications 
6.1.1 The Recursive Remindings Framework 
The finding that recollecting change reduced proactive interference is consistent with previous 
work using both political materials (Putnam et al. 2014) and word pairs (Wahlheim & Jacoby, 
2013). This result reinforces the importance of recursive remindings in understanding 
interference. As outlined in the introduction, detecting a change during a second event requires 
covert retrieval of the first event. Doing so results in both events becoming embedded in memory 
along with the experience of detecting the change. Later, recollecting this change (or accessing 
the recursive trace) should lead to accurate recall because doing so provides access to both the 
first and second positions along with their temporal order. The current experiments corroborate 
this interpretation with a revised set of realistic political materials and with a more diverse 
subject population. 
Experiment 2 provided a new approach to measuring change recollection. Previous methods 
have included directly asking subjects if they remember change (e.g., Jacoby et al. 2013; Putnam 
et al. 2014) and by using a remindings report procedure, where subjects are asked to recall the 
more recent item, and then are asked to recall any other items that came to mind (Wahlheim & 
Jacoby, 2013). Both of these approaches occurred immediately after recalling the target item. In 
Experiment 2, change recollection was required to accurately respond in the news verification 
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task, which occurred in a separate phase before the recall test. Conditionalizing cued recall on 
the news verification task yielded a similar outcome to conditionalizing recall on the standard 
change recollection task: proactive interference was eliminated for the changed items when 
subjects recollected change. This finding suggests that the news verification task is a reliable 
method of measuring change recollection. 
In addition, the news verification task may have provided retrieval practice for remembering 
change. Correctly verifying a news statement in Experiment 2 led to the most accurate change 
recollection at the final test across all experiments in this dissertation: d’ was 1.47 whereas the 
next highest (in Experiment 1) was 0.86. This is interesting, because it suggests that retrieval 
practice can enhance memory for change. This concept could be explored in more detail in an 
experiment where some items are not exposed in the news phase, some items are presented 
without requiring subject verification, and some items are presented but require subjects to verify 
their accuracy. This design would parallel a testing effect experiment with a test, restudy, and no 
re-exposure condition (see Roediger, Putnam, & Smith, 2011 pp. 5-7 for a discussion of control 
conditions in testing effect experiments).  
A key idea in the recursive remindings framework is that change recollection depends on earlier 
detection (Jacoby et al. 2013). Thus, any manipulation that can encourage accurate change 
detection should lead to more accurate change recollection. As noted earlier different instructions 
can guide subjects to look back to previous events in different ways (Jacoby & Wahlheim, 2013; 
Jacoby et al., in press; Wahlheim et al., 2014). The hypothesis in Experiment 3 was that the 
looking back phrases (e.g. “In contrast to my previous position I now believe…”) would 
encourage subjects to look back to the first debate. Doing so would increase covert change 
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detection which should lead to more accurate change recollection at the test. The looking back 
statements, however, did not improve change recollection accuracy, but instead, made it more 
likely that subjects would report remembering change for the repetition and control items.  
Why did the looking back statements not lead to more accurate change recollection? It could 
have been a carryover effect–using a within-subjects manipulation might have led to subjects to 
look back for every item–but looking back in such a fashion should have led to more accurate 
change recollection, which did not occur (change recollection accuracy in Experiment 3 was 
similar to Experiment 2, and both were lower than Experiment 1). A more likely explanation is 
that subjects trusted the politicians. When the candidates said they changed positions, the 
subjects believed them, and were more likely to report remembering change at the final test. For 
the repetition and control items, this increase in the change recollection rate was erroneous, 
meaning the looking back statements were serving as misinformation. 
Several variations of Experiment 3 could be interesting. For example, all of the introductory 
phrases could be accurate (e.g., the repetition items could be paired with consistent statements, 
e.g., “I’ve said this before and I’ll say it again…”). Or a between-subjects manipulation could be 
used where one group gets no introductory statements and another gets accurate introductory 
phrases. In both cases change recollection accuracy should be improved at the final test. 
However it would be difficult to determine whether that increased accuracy is the result of actual 
change recollection or subjects relying on the suggestion of the introductory phrases. Pulling 
those two factors apart would be difficult. In sum, methodological problems in Experiment 3 
prevented any new conclusions about the recursive remindings framework. However, the looking 
back statements did increase erroneous change recollection, which is an interesting finding from 
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the perspective of the misinformation effect (although it would be quite unusual for a politician 
to claim to change positions when he actually has been consistent). 
6.1.2 The Misinformation Effect 
Inaccurate information was presented to subjects in both Experiment 2 and Experiment 3. In both 
cases, the misleading information affected later change recollection. Subjects were more likely to 
recollect change after seeing a news statement that suggested change in Experiment 2 and after 
seeing an introductory statement from a politician where he claimed to change positions in 
Experiment 3. Change recollection accuracy did not improve, nor was recall for the changed 
items strongly affected. This pattern of results indicates that the suggestion of change led to an 
increase in the change recollection rate, but that the increase did not reflect true change 
recollection; subjects were reporting change on the basis of the suggestion from the news 
statement or introductory phrase rather than actually recollecting change. 
Why did the potentially misleading information not affect recall? One answer is that both the 
news statements and the introductory phrases were about the candidate’s consistency between 
debates, rather than his actual positions. If the news statements had made concrete but 
misleading suggestions about the candidate’s current position (e.g., “Mike Shipman said he 
supported same sex marriage”), then recall might have suffered regardless of change 
recollection. 
In both Experiment 2 and 3, the misleading information had small effect sizes (ηp2 = .07 and ηp2 = 
.10 respectively), raising the question of why the misleading statements did not have a larger 
effect on change recollection. Previous work has suggested that misinformation is ineffective 
when subjects notice the inconsistency between the original event and the post-event narrative 
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(Loftus, 1979; Tousignant et al. 1986). Along these lines, recent work on our lab (Putnam & 
Roediger, 2015) conducted a misinformation experiment with measures of change detection and 
change recollection. Recollecting change eliminated the misinformation effect, and sometimes 
even led to improved memory compared to the control condition. Thus, there is strong evidence 
that misinformation is ineffective when subjects notice the inconsistency and remember it at the 
final test. Experiment 2 provided further support for this view. Subjects who correctly verified 
the news statements showed incredibly accurate change recollection, and consequently showed 
improved recall for the changed items. In contrast, subjects who did not correctly verify the news 
statements showed poor change recollection accuracy. 
The consequences of failing to reject misinformation can be seen clearly in the change 
recollection rates for the repetition items in Table F3  (in Appendix F). If a subject correctly 
verified a statement (e.g., responding True to the news statement “Mike Shipman was consistent 
in his views on Same Sex Marriage” in reference to a repetition item), the erroneous change 
recollection rate was .09. In contrast, if a subject endorsed a misleading statement (e.g., 
responding True to the news statement “Mike Shipman changed positions on Same Sex 
Marriage” in reference to a changed item), then the erroneous change recollection rate was .27. 
Thus, subjects were three times more likely to remember change when none occurred if they 
endorsed a misleading statement than if they correctly verified a statement. In sum, noticing and 
remembering a change may prevent misinformation. 
6.1.3 Attitudes and Memory 
Collecting data on the internet allowed me to recruit a politically diverse group of subjects. In 
doing so I was able to begin to address some questions that explored the relationship between 
memory and attitudes. The relationship is a complex one. Hastie and Park (1986) outlined five 
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different models from the social cognition literature, with some models suggesting that memories 
shape judgments and attitudes (as in the case of the availability heuristic) and other models 
suggesting that judgments and attitudes shape memories (e.g., through biased encoding or 
retrieval).  The current experiments (in particular, Experiment 1) addressed both the question of 
whether attitudes could shape memory (through a congeniality effect) and whether memory can 
shape attitudes (via change recollection).  
Experiment 1 showed a small congeniality effect in recall (Cohen’s d = 0.11) suggesting that 
subjects had better memory for information that was consistent with their self-reported political 
orientation. This small effect size is not unusual when compared to previous work; a meta-
analysis examining 70 congeniality effect experiments found an average effect size of 0.23 with 
a 95% confidence interval of 0.18 to 0.27, leading the authors to conclude that there may be no 
distinct advantage for remembering attitude-consistent information (Eagly et al. 1999). Along 
those lines, no congeniality effect was found in Experiment 2. Eagly et al. (2001) argued that 
congeniality effects might be hard to find because actively defending one’s viewpoint against 
challenging, attitude-inconsistent information may be an effective encoding strategy. Indeed, 
recent research has failed to show strong evidence of a congeniality effect (Eagly, Kulesa, 
Brannon, Shaw, Huston-Comeaux, 2000). Eagly et al. (2000), however, did show that many 
other variables, such as attitude strength, may moderate how well relevant information is 
remembered. Thus, the current experiments do not contribute much to an understanding of the 
congeniality effect. The hypothesis that change recollection might also be affected by the 
congruency between a subject’s attitudes and the current topic was rejected in both Experiment 1 
and Experiment 2.  
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As Eagly et al. (2000) noted, many variables could potentially affect recall for attitudinally 
relevant information, including how strong someone’s attitudes are. A future project could have 
subjects rate how important each political topic is to them personally, or rate how familiar they 
are with the issue. The expectation is that subjects would have better recall and change 
recollection for the topics for which they hold strong opinions or know well. Such a finding 
would provide a concrete example of how individuals differ in change recollection, something 
previous work has suggested. (Jacoby & Wahlheim, 2013). 
On a side note, one curious pattern that occurred in both Experiment 1 and 2 was that subjects 
had better recall for the changed positions when the candidates were shifting away from the 
subject’s self-reported political orientation, rather than towards the subject’s political orientation. 
This pattern occurred despite change recollection being equal in both directions. One possibility 
is that subjects felt betrayed by the politicians when the candidates moved away from the 
subjects’ own views, which may have made those positions more memorable. 
Experiment 1 also addressed the question of whether memory can shape attitudes. In both 
Experiment 1 and 2 subjects preferred the candidates from their own parties. They were more 
likely to vote for them and provided higher rankings of trustworthiness and likability. Despite 
that strong tendency, there was also some indication that subjects’ experiences with the 
candidates during Debate 2 shaped the post-test judgments. The change recollection rates for 
each candidate were correlated with the estimates of how candidates would change in the future, 
suggesting that noticing and remembering change shaped the future change judgment. In 
addition, in Experiment 1 change recollection and the candidates’ trustworthiness and likability 
ratings (either in the second judgments or in the change between the two judgments) were 
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negatively correlated, indicating that remembering more change was associated with a more 
negative attitude towards the candidates. (Experiment 2 did not show that pattern, but the news 
statements may have added noise to the change recollection judgments.) Thus, subjects did 
appear to base their judgments on their memories of the candidate, although the exact 
mechanism is unclear. Subjects could be updating an on-line tally of how often a candidate 
changes position and then retrieving the most recent tally to make their judgment; or subjects 
could be thinking back to the actual debates and making an estimate of how often the candidate 
changed positions. 
6.2 Potential Limitations 
6.2.1 Alternatives to the Recursive Remindings Framework 
The recursive remindings framework does have some similarity to other models of memory. 
Karpicke, Lehman, and Rue (2014), for example, recently proposed an episodic context account 
of retrieval practice, arguing that the memory benefits of retrieval practice accrue from updating 
prior contexts. Their account was heavily influenced by a temporal context model approach to 
memory (Estes, 1955; Howard & Kahana, 2002; Kahana, Howard, & Polyn, 2008; Siegel & 
Kahana, 2014).  Such a theory suggests that people encode information about events as it occurs 
in a given context. Context changes slowly over time, and retrieving information involves 
partially re-instating the prior context. Doing so results in an updating process where elements of 
both the original and the new context are combined. On a later test, retrieval is easier because the 
updated context provides a means for restricting a search set.  
The episodic context account of retrieval practice (and the temporal context model) bear some 
similarity to the recursive remindings framework in that successful recall is the result of 
connecting two separate events in memory. They are different in that the recursive remindings 
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framework emphasizes the target events (or items) whereas the episodic context account 
emphasizes the context in which those events occur. The engine in the recursive remindings 
framework is spontaneous study-phase retrieval whereas the engine in the episodic context 
account is intentional retrieval practice. However, the two approaches can co-exist: Remindings 
are a form of covert retrieval, so the episodic contextual account may partially explain why 
remindings enhance memory. 
6.2.2 Item Selection Effects 
As outlined in the introduction, item selection effects are a concern when using conditional 
analyses.  A critic might argue that the reduction in proactive interference seen when change is 
recollected is not driven by change recollection, but rather is an artifact of using conditional 
analyses. Some items may be easier to recall than others, and the conditional analyses may 
simply collect those items (for which both recall and change recollection is accurate). However, 
previous experiments have shown that remindings can lead to improved memory without the 
need to rely on conditionalized analyses, reducing the concern of item selection effects (Jacoby, 
1974; 2013; Jacoby & Wahlheim, 2013; Jacoby et al., in press; Wahlheim et al., 2014). In 
addition, the current project included hierarchical regression analyses that suggested that change 
recollection often explained unique variance in predicting recall after controlling for item effects 
and differences in subject memory abilities, replicating previous work (Jacoby & Wahlheim, 
2013; Putnam et al. 2014; Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2013). Experiment 3 did not show a unique 
contribution of change recollection, but the looking back statements in that experiment may have 
biased the change recollection measure. Taken together, these results suggest that remindings are 
driving the reduction in proactive interference, rather than any item selection effects. 
  
 
96 
A more nuanced concern is that item selection effects do exist, but ones that are unique to 
individual subjects. Rather than some items being more memorable overall, each subject could 
find some items more memorable than others, raising a similar concern that the reduction in 
proactive interference is due to the change recollection measure collecting the items that are 
easier to remember rather than change recollection driving the reduction in interference. 
Addressing this question statistically, however, would require knowing the baseline level of 
recall for each item for each subject (recall for a control item) and comparing that to recall for a 
changed item when change or was not recollected. This comparison is not possible in the current 
experiments because items are never in both the control and the changed condition for a single 
subject. This concern could be ameliorated in an experiment that uses a between-subjects design 
where some subjects are encouraged to look back to the earlier debate and others are not. If the 
looking back group shows enhanced recall for the changed items compared to the control group, 
this would suggest that remindings are reducing interference without the need to rely on 
conditional analyses. Such a finding was reported in Putnam et al. (2014, Experiment 3), where a 
group that was given an explicit change detection task showed better recall for the changed items 
than a control group. Thus, it is unlikely that a subject by item interaction is driving the reduction 
in proactive interference. 
 
6.2.3 Artificial Nature of the Paradigm 
Using political materials to explore interference is exciting for many reasons - it provides a 
conceptual replication of previous work, suggests new directions for research, and even 
addresses new questions that cannot be answered with basic materials. However, straddling the 
line between basic and applied research does raise some challenges, particularly with 
applications to politics. 
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For example, in the current experiments the candidates change positions more often than would 
be expected in a real campaign. Currently, the candidates change positions on 1/3 of the issues. 
This rate was chosen to provide a large number of observations and to ensure a balanced design. 
Future work, however, could and should explore how people notice and remember a politician’s 
single change in position amidst an otherwise consistent platform. 
A related criticism is that the changes the politicians make in the experiments are not true flip-
flops. Rather, the candidates are shifting within their own camp and never changing to the 
opposite side. Although complete flip-flops are what often grab headlines (e.g., John Kerry’s 
comment on Iraq;  Hummel, 2010), smaller changes in position–perhaps changing the 
implementation of a policy without changing the underlying principle–are perhaps more realistic 
in politics today. It is possible that complete flip-flops are more memorable or noteworthy, and 
almost certainly they would have larger impact on voter attitudes. Full flip-flops are certainly 
worth exploring in future research. 
Another concern is that the assessment of political orientation assumed a single continuum, 
ranging from liberal Democrats on the left to conservative Republicans on the right. However, 
some political affiliations do not fit neatly into that continuum. Libertarians, for example, 
typically endorse liberal views on social issues and conservative views on fiscal issues. A more 
nuanced approach to measuring political orientation could be used (e.g., by having subjects 
report a separate category for social and economic issues) but most Americans can easily place 
themselves in the left-right continuum (Jost, 2006).  
One final challenge is the number of ways a voter can interpret a politician’s change in position. 
To provide a concrete example, in 2012 President Obama reversed his position on same sex 
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marriage, saying he now supported it. Voters could have reacted negatively, either because they 
did not support gay marriage or because Obama’s change made him seem untrustworthy and 
opportunistic. In contrast, voters could have reacted positively, either because they supported 
same sex marriage or because Obama’s change made him appear open-minded and in touch with 
the rest of society. Indeed, how a politician frames a change may influence how it is interpreted. 
A recent newspaper article noted that many politicians (including Obama) have started using the 
term “evolve” to describe a change in position, both because it implies personal growth and 
because it suggests external forces are responsible for the change (Leibovich, 2015). Thus, any 
researcher who wishes to address voter reactions to flip-flopping needs to consider many factors, 
such as the voter’s views on the issue, what position the politician holds, and how the change is 
framed. The current experiments had politicians changing positions on a variety of issues, and 
framed them all similarly, but despite that, managed to show some negative correlations between 
change recollection and attitudes towards the candidates. 
6.3 Applications to Politics 
What implications do the results of these experiments have for politics? Despite being grounded 
in an artificial paradigm there might still be a few suggestions for voters and politicians. 
Political scientists have long discussed how voters make decisions about who to vote for. One 
theory suggests an on-line model where voters continually update their evaluation of candidates 
as they process campaign information. When it is time to vote, people base their decision on the 
summary evaluation of the candidates rather than thinking back to the campaign (Lodge, 
Steenbergen, & Brau, 1995). Another theory suggests a memory-based model where people do 
think back to campaign events to shape their voting choices (Redlawsk, 2001).  
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In either case, the current results may be relevant. If voters are thinking back to campaign events, 
then clearly remindings are important–any event that is well remembered (perhaps because of 
noticing a repetition or detecting change) may have a larger impact on a voting decision than 
something that is less well remembered. If voters are updating an on-line tally it could still be 
beneficial to notice and remember the change. In particular, campaigns are filled with half-truths, 
misconstrued stories, and political spin. Having a clear recollection of when a politician has 
changed position and when he has not will help prevent a voter from falling prey to 
misinformation. Also, voters may have certain issues that they feel strongly about; if a politician 
changes position on that issue it could have a large impact on how that voter views the politician. 
Politicians may also learn something from these experiments. In most cases, subjects continued 
to support the candidates from their own party, despite the politicians changing positions quite 
often. This suggests that politicians should have some flexibility to change positions (at least 
within their own camp), but doing so too often may result in some negative consequences, such 
as developing a reputation as a flip-flopper. In many ways the results here affirm what political 
scientists have previously believed: changing positions is often advantageous, but doing it too 
quickly or too often can backfire. 
If a politician is changing position and wants people to remember what his or her new position is, 
then it would be beneficial for people to notice and remember that the change occurred. Having 
third party sources repeat the new position and reaffirm that it is a change may help. Other 
research suggests that the politician may want to provide a justification for the change, to reduce 
any negative perceptions associated with changing (Levendusky & Horowitz, 2012). Simply 
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acknowledging the change would make it more likely that people would remember the change in 
the future, but it is unclear whether that would translate to better memory for the new position. 
In contrast, how could a politician change positions without having anyone remember it in the 
future? Saying that he has always held the same position might work, as would having a third 
party reinforce his consistency. But in either case such tactics might backfire if subjects have a 
clear memory for change. Returning to the quote from the introduction, in response to the Etch A 
Sketch comment, Romney said “The issues I’m running on will be exactly the same. I’m running 
as a conservative Republican, and I was a conservative Republican governor …The policies and 
positions are the same,” (Parker, 2012). Despite claiming to be consistent, Romney was unable to 
avoid being labeled a flip-flopper. 
6.4 Concluding Comments 
The three experiments in this dissertation explored proactive interference with realistic political 
materials. Neisser (1976) might have approved. He wrote: 
“…cognitive psychologists must make a greater effort to understand cognition as 
it occurs in the ordinary environment and in the context of natural purposeful 
activity. This would not mean an end to laboratory experiments, but a 
commitment to the study of variables that are ecologically important rather than 
those that are easily manageable” (p. 7). 
Using the political materials provided a way to explore proactive interference with in a context 
that at least has some parallel to the real world. Engaged voters really do want to remember what 
political candidates claim to believe. Using the political materials also provided more support for 
the recursive remindings framework and allowed the examination of new questions that would 
not be possible with basic materials, such as understanding the relationship between attitudes and 
memory. Flip-flopping accusations will likely continue to be a part of American politics for a 
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long time, providing a rich arena for exploring questions about memory, attitudes, and decision-
making. This research is one step towards understanding the cognitive and social implications of 
noticing and remembering changes in position. 
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Appendix A: Political Materials 
Topic Liberal Strong Liberal Weak Conservative Weak Conservative Strong 
Abortion Abortions should be 
available and legal to 
women of all ages. 
Abortions should be safe, 
legal, and rare. 
Abortions should be 
available only in cases of 
rape. 
Abortions should never 
be available to anybody. 
Affirmative Action When making hiring 
decisions, it is important 
to help applicants from 
disadvantaged groups, 
such as minorities. 
When making hiring 
decisions, it is important 
to consider a variety of 
factors. 
Hiring decisions should 
be made according to the 
skills and qualifications 
of the candidate. 
Hiring decisions should 
be made according to 
merit;  affirmative action 
is just another form of 
racism. 
Affordable Care Act The Affordable Care Act 
is the perfect solution to 
increasing health care 
coverage. 
The Affordable Care Act 
needs a little bit of 
tweaking in its 
implementation. 
The Affordable Care Act 
will lead us to impede on 
the freedom of American 
citizens. 
The Affordable Care Act 
will lead us to death 
panels and financial ruin. 
Alternative Energy Improving alternative 
energy options, such as 
wind and solar, should be 
our nation's biggest 
priority. 
Improving alternative 
energy options, such as 
wind and solar, is 
tentatively worth 
exploring. 
Wind and solar energy 
programs are a nice 
supplement to fossil fuels. 
Wind and solar energy 
programs are untested, 
unreliable, and expensive 
substitutes for oil. 
American Patriotism Our American country is a 
great one, but we are no 
better than any other 
country. 
Our American country is a 
great one, and we should 
be honored to be a leader 
in the global community. 
America’s freedom, 
equality, and laissez-fair 
economics make us a 
major world superpower. 
America’s freedom, 
equality, and laissez-fair 
economics are a sign that 
God wants us to lead the 
world. 
Border Security We don't need to build a 
wall along the border, we 
need to welcome more 
immigrants. 
We don't need to build a 
wall along the border, we 
need to focus on 
immigration policies. 
The best way to secure 
the US-Mexico border is 
by improving both 
security and immigration 
policies. 
The best way to secure 
the US-Mexico border is 
to build a 1,950 mile 
fence. 
Contraception Contraception should be 
available to women of all 
ages for free. 
Contraception should be 
available to all adult 
women through their 
health insurance. 
Forcing health insurance 
companies to pay for 
contraception is a 
complicated issue. 
Forcing health insurance 
companies to pay for 
contraception violates 
religious freedom. 
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Death Penalty Wrongful convictions 
mean the death penalty 
should never be used as 
punishment. 
Wrongful convictions 
mean the death penalty 
should only be used in 
extreme cases. 
In a case of first degree 
murder the death penalty 
should be considered as 
an option. 
In a case of first degree 
murder the death penalty 
should always be used. 
Don't Ask Don't Tell Don't Ask Don't Tell 
needed to be repealed 
because it was a 
homophobic and 
discriminatory policy. 
Don't Ask Don't Tell 
needed to be repealed 
because it was an 
ineffective policy. 
Don't Ask Don't Tell was 
a good policy that 
maintained military 
morale. 
Don't Ask Don't Tell was 
a good policy that did not 
go far enough to keep 
gays out of the military. 
Flag Desecration The right to burn a flag 
must be protected as a 
form of free speech. 
The right to burn a flag is 
a complicated issue. 
Flag burning should be 
discouraged because it is 
unpatriotic. 
Flag burning should be 
prohibited because it is 
treasonous. 
Global Warming According to scientific 
research, global climate 
change is man-made, and 
is the largest threat to 
human society today.  
 
According to scientific 
research, global climate 
change exists, but might 
not be due to human 
activity alone. 
Global climate change is 
not a big problem, 
because the Earth could 
be entering a natural 
warmer phase. 
Global climate change is 
not a problem, because 
we are not sure if it even 
exists. 
Government Debt Running a government is 
expensive; to maintain 
programs without 
increasing debt we will 
need to raise taxes. 
Running a government is 
expensive; we will need to 
consider both raising taxes 
and trimming the budget. 
The government should 
cut spending to reduce 
our debt responsibly. 
The government should 
cut spending across the 
entire budget, except for 
defense, to eliminate the 
deficit. 
Gun Control The right to own guns 
applies to militias; 
individuals don't need 
weapons. 
The right to own guns 
should be subject to some 
restrictions. 
The second amendment 
provides a right to bear 
arms; law abiding citizens 
should be able to own 
weapons. 
The second amendment 
provides a right to bear 
arms; every citizen 
should own a firearm. 
Health Care The federal government 
should provide universal 
health care for all 
Americans. 
The federal government 
should provide universal 
health care for all children 
under 18. 
The federal government 
should not be providing 
health care; that should be 
left to the states. 
The federal government 
should not be providing 
health care; that should 
be left to the free market. 
Immigration Benefits Illegal immigrants in good 
standing should be 
granted citizenship. 
Illegal immigrants in good 
standing should be given 
work permits after paying 
a fee. 
Living in a state illegally, 
even for a long time, 
should not allow 
immigrants to take 
advantage of American 
resources. 
Living in a state illegally 
for any amount of time 
should result in 
immediate deportation. 
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Labor Unions Labor unions protect the 
basic human rights of 
workers from greedy 
corporate exploitation. 
Labor unions protect 
workers by providing 
collective bargaining 
rights. 
Labor unions need limits 
on collective bargaining 
rights. 
Labor unions inflate costs 
and are a front for the 
liberal agenda. 
Legalization of 
Marijuana 
Marijuana should be legal 
for all adults without 
restriction. 
Marijuana should be legal 
for all adults for medicinal 
purposes. 
Marijuana should be 
illegal in this country, but 
some states have decided 
it is OK. 
Marijuana should be 
illegal in this country, 
because it is unsafe, 
destroys lives, and causes 
crime. 
Mitt Romney Mitt Romney made his 
wealth by lying, 
swindling, and cheating to 
get ahead. 
Mitt Romney made his 
wealth by being a shrewd 
businessman. 
As a presidential 
candidate, Governor 
Romney had some issues 
but would have been a 
fine president. 
As a presidential 
candidate, Governor 
Romney had the potential 
to be the best leader our 
country has ever seen. 
Nuclear Weapons Nuclear weapons are 
dangerous regardless of 
who holds them; we must 
eradicate our entire 
nuclear arsenal. 
Nuclear Weapons are 
dangerous regardless of 
who holds them; we need 
to ensure our arsenal is 
secure. 
To deter terrorists from 
acquiring nuclear 
weapons we must 
maintain our nuclear 
program. 
To deter terrorists from 
acquiring nuclear 
weapons we must have 
the strongest nuclear 
weapons program in the 
world. 
Occupy Wall Street The occupy wall street 
movement is about 
frustration with income 
inequality. 
The occupy wall street 
movement is about 
frustration with the 
economy. 
The occupy wall street 
protestors do not have a 
clear agenda about what 
they want. 
The occupy wall street 
protesters are just loud 
complainers who are too 
lazy to work. 
Off-shore Oil Drilling Off-shore oil drilling is 
dangerous for our 
environment and should 
be completely banned. 
Off-shore oil drilling is 
dangerous for our 
environment and should 
be regulated. 
Domestic oil is vital for 
our future; we should 
carefully and slowly 
expand off-shore drilling. 
Domestic oil is vital for 
our future; we should 
immediately lift all 
restrictions and invest in 
new sites. 
Paying For College The federal government 
should forgive all student 
loan debt. 
The federal government 
should reduce the interest 
rate on student loans. 
College students should 
work hard to pay for 
college, getting a part-
time job if they need it. 
College students should 
work hard to pay for 
college, not rely on 
government handouts. 
President Obama President Obama has done 
a fabulous job leading the 
country in both foreign 
and domestic areas. 
President Obama has done 
a fabulous job leading the 
country on foreign issues, 
but has faltered on some 
social issues. 
President Obama's 
policies have not been 
able to solve our 
country's problems. 
President Obama's 
policies are undermining 
American freedom and 
leading us towards a 
socialist society. 
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Public Schools To continue educating our 
youth we must invest 
more money into public 
schools. 
To continue educating our 
youth, we must invest 
more money into public 
and private schools. 
The public school system 
has many problems; 
students should be able to 
go to private schools. 
The public school system 
has many problems; we 
should move all teaching 
to private schools. 
Role of Government The role of government is 
to ensure that every 
person has a chance to 
succeed. 
The role of government is 
to secure the rights and 
freedoms of individual 
citizens. 
The ideal federal 
government should work 
in tandem with State 
governments and the 
private sector. 
The ideal federal 
government should stay 
small and out of the lives 
of its citizens. 
Same Sex Marriage Partners of the same sex 
should be recognized 
through marriage. 
Partners of the same sex 
should be recognized 
through civil unions. 
Traditional marriage 
should be an issue for 
individual state 
legislatures. 
Traditional marriage 
should be protected 
through a constitutional 
amendment. 
School Safety Arming teachers and 
security guards will 
contribute to a culture of 
violence in our society. 
Arming teachers and 
security guards might 
help, but we also need 
better mental health 
resources. 
In order to protect 
classrooms, we should 
increase the number of 
school security guards. 
In order to protect 
classrooms, teachers and 
school administrators 
should be allowed to 
carry firearms. 
Separation of Church 
and State 
Religious symbols in 
government spaces should 
be removed, because our 
country has many 
religious traditions. 
Religious symbols in 
government spaces should 
not be added, even though 
we are a mostly Christian 
country. 
Within public and 
government spaces, 
religious symbols should 
be allowed. 
Within public and 
government spaces, we 
should honor our 
Christian heritage. 
Sex Education The best way to combat 
teen sex issues is through 
comprehensive sex 
education programs 
starting in kindergarten. 
The best way to combat 
teen sex issues is through 
exposure to educational 
resources. 
Teen sex education 
programs should be 
abstinence-plus. 
Teen sex education 
programs should be 
abstinence-only. 
Social Security We cannot cut back social 
security now, we need to 
expand it for future 
generations. 
We cannot cut back social 
security now, we just need 
to make some 
adjustments. 
Social security will be 
bankrupt in a few years - 
we need to overhaul the 
program. 
Social security will be 
bankrupt in a few years - 
seniors should manage 
their own savings in the 
private market. 
Stem Cell Research Stem cell research is vital 
to curing many horrible 
genetic diseases. 
Stem cell research is vital 
to medical science but is 
also ethically 
questionable. 
Stem cell research is 
probably not worth it, as 
major medical 
breakthroughs are rare. 
Stem cell research is just 
not worth it; taking an 
innocent life never is. 
Teaching Creationism in 
Schools 
Creationism should never 
be taught in public 
schools. 
Creationism should only 
be explored in schools as 
a historical alternative to 
evolution. 
Creationism should be 
taught in schools, as the 
view that God created the 
world is plausible.  
Creationism should be 
taught in schools, as the 
view that God created the 
world is correct. 
 [114] 
 
 
Trickle Down 
Economics 
Giving tax cuts to the rich 
only makes them richer 
when we should help the 
poor directly. 
Giving tax cuts to the rich 
is probably not the best 
way to grow the economy. 
The route to economic 
recovery is through tax 
breaks for businesses and 
the middle class. 
The route to economic 
recovery is through tax 
breaks for corporations 
and wealthy Americans. 
United Nations The US should support 
the UN in every way 
possible, including 
delegating our resources 
to their leadership. 
The US should support 
the UN as long as their 
goals are compatible with 
ours. 
As an organization, the 
UN is ineffective and 
relatively harmless. 
As an organization the 
UN is corrupt, 
incompetent, and often 
anti-American. 
War on Terror Terrorism must be 
addressed through 
diplomacy as more war 
leads to more terrorists. 
Terrorism must be 
addressed by a 
combination of the careful 
use of force and 
diplomacy. 
Radical Islamists pose a 
great threat to our nation; 
we must deal with them 
strategically and 
carefully. 
Radical Islamists pose a 
great threat to our nation; 
we need to continue the 
war on terror at all costs. 
Welfare Welfare programs are 
essential; they provide a 
safety net for all 
Americans. 
Welfare programs are 
expensive but useful; they 
support people in times of 
need. 
Welfare programs, 
although sometimes 
helpful, also discourage 
people from looking for 
work. 
Welfare programs are a 
huge drain on our 
economy and reward the 
least deserving of our 
citizens. 
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Appendix B: Photos of the Political 
Candidates 
Photos of the political candidates, John Baker and Mike Shipman, and of the locations where the 
two debates occurred. 
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Appendix C: Political Expertise Quiz 
Political Expertise Quiz. Correct answers are bolded (order of responses was randomized). 
 
Of the two, which past presidential candidate is most likely to oppose the legalization of same-sex 
marriages? 
• Barack Obama 
• Mitt Romney 
• not sure 
 
Before his election as Vice President, which state did Joe Biden represent in his role as U.S. senator? 
• Connecticut 
• Delaware 
• New York 
• Pennsylvania 
• not sure 
 
How many senators are in the U.S. Senate? 
• 50 
• 100 
• 535 
• 538 
• not sure 
 
Who is the current Speaker of the House? 
• Newt Gingrich 
• John Boehner 
• Nancy Pelosi 
• Harry Reid 
• not sure 
 
Which party currently controls the US Senate? 
• Democrats 
• Republicans 
• not sure 
  
Who is the current Secretary of State for the US Government? 
• Hillary Clinton 
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• John Kerry 
• Condoleeza Rice 
• Colin Powell 
 
Out of the following states, which has historically voted strongly Republican in national elections? 
• Minnesota 
• Delaware 
• Oklahoma 
• Pennsylvania 
• Washington 
 
Of the two past candidates, which is most likely to restrict the circumstances under which women will be 
able to legally obtain an abortion? 
• Barack Obama 
• Mitt Romney  
• not sure  
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Appendix D: Objective Political Orientation 
Survey 
Objective Political Orientation Survey. Subjects responded on a 4 point scale with the 
following options for each statement: Completely Agree, Somewhat Agree, Somewhat Disagree, 
Completely Disagree. Survey adapted from Zell and Bernstein (2014). 
 
1) There need to be stricter laws and regulations to protect the environment.  
 
2) The government should help more needy people even if it means going deeper into debt.  
 
3) The growing number of newcomers from other countries threaten traditional American 
customs and values.  
 
4) I never doubt the existence of God.  
 
5) Business corporations make too much profit.  
 
6) Gays and lesbians should be allowed to marry legally.  
 
7) The government needs to do more to make health care affordable and accessible.  
 
8) One parent can bring up a child as well as two parents together.  
 
9) Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good.  
 
10) Abortion should be illegal in all or most cases. 
 
11) Labor unions are necessary to protect the working person.  
 
12) Poor people have become too dependent on government assistance programs.  
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Appendix E: Additional Results and 
Discussion - Experiment 1 
This appendix contains additional analyses not reported in the results section of Experiment 1. 
All post-hoc comparisons used a Bonferroni correction. 
Recall 
I conducted several other analyses with the recall results. First, subjects were better at recalling 
the strong version of a statement (M = .56, SEM = .02) than the weak version (M = .40, SEM = 
.02), t(125) = 16.40, p < .001, d = 0.82. This pattern is inconsistent with previous results (Putnam 
et al., 2014) that showed no difference in recall for the different item strengths. One explanation 
could be the revised materials, where the strong statements were more extreme, which may have 
made them more salient. 
Second, a one-way ANOVA with counterbalancing order as a between-subjects factor suggested 
there was a significant effect, F(5, 120) = 2.44, p = .04, ηp2 =  0.09, but post-hoc comparisons 
revealed that there was only a marginal effect of one comparison (CB order 1 vs. CB order 2), p 
= .06.  
Third, several analyses in the main results section reported outcomes as a function of the 
subjects’ self-reported political orientation. Subjects reported their political orientation on a 7-
point scale, but in interest of simplicity, political orientation was collapsed into three groups 
(Democrats, Independents, and Republicans). Additionally, subjects completed an objective 
measure of political orientation which also assigned them to one of seven political orientations. 
 [120] 
 
 
Table E1 shows recall collapsed across item type as a function of self-reported political 
orientation. A one-way ANOVA showed that self-reported political orientation affected recall, 
F(6, 119) = 2.91, p = .01, ηp2 =  0.13, with post-hoc comparisons revealing that the Moderate 
Republicans had better recall than the Independents and Average Republicans, p = .040 and p = 
.047 respectively. In contrast, objective political orientation did not influence recall, F = 1.41. 
Taken together, political orientation did not appear to affect overall recall. 
 
Table E1: Recall as a Function of Self-Reported Political Orientation 
Self-Reported Political 
Orientation Mean SEM n  
Liberal Democrat 0.51 0.03 25  
Average Democrat 0.45 0.06 12  
Moderate Democrat 0.51 0.06 13  
Independent 0.40 0.03 26  
Moderate Republican 0.56 0.04 23  
Average Republican 0.38 0.04 16  
Conservative Republican 0.53 0.04 11  
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Finally, I checked whether any subject-level variables affected recall. Table E2 shows that recall 
(collapsed across item type) was correlated with performance on the political expertise quiz, rτ = 
.24, p < .001, suggesting that subjects who knew more about politics may have had better recall 
in the experiment. The following variables, however, did not influence recall: Self-reported 
political expertise, subject education, and age, all ps > .18. Subjects who were born outside of the 
U.S. may have had better recall than subjects born inside the U.S. (M = .54 vs. M = .47) but 
having only six subjects born outside the U.S. made a direct comparison untenable. 
 
Table E2: Recall as a Function of Performance on Political Expertise Quiz 
Score On Expertise Quiz Mean Recall SEM n 
3 0.39 0.05 10 
4 0.44 0.04 18 
5 0.36 0.04 22 
6 0.51 0.04 19 
7 0.51 0.04 22 
8 0.55 0.03 35 
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Change Recollection 
For the additional change recollection analyses, the primary dependent variable was change 
recollection accuracy as measured by Hits - False Alarms (with Control items serving as the false 
alarms). Counterbalancing order significantly affected change recollection, F(5, 120) = 3.68, p = 
.004, ηp2 = 0.13, with post-hoc tests suggesting that counterbalancing order 0 (M = .37, SEM = 
.06) led to better change recollection that counterbalancing order 4 (M = 0.16, SEM = .03). 
Examining the items in the different counterbalancing groups failed to reveal any explanation for 
why change recollection was better in order 0. After noting this pattern I re-assigned items to 
different counterbalancing groups for Experiments 2 and 3. 
Subjects were equally accurate in recollecting change for the Democratic and Republican 
candidate (0.23 and 0.24 respectively), t < 1, and had similar change recollection for the strong 
and weak items (both 0.24), t < 1. Furthermore, subjects from all political orientations had 
similar change recollection levels, regardless of whether political orientation was measured by 
self-report or the objective measure (Fs < 1.74). Additionally, I checked to see whether subjects 
were better at recollecting change when the candidates were from their own political party. 
However, two separate 3 (subject political orientation) x 2 (candidate party) ANOVAs failed to 
reveal any main effects or interactions, regardless of whether subject orientation was measured 
by self-report or the objective quiz (all Fs < 2.45). In addition, I conducted a paired samples t-
test comparing change recollection for congruent items (e.g., when Democrats were attempting 
to recollect change for a liberal position) to change recollection for incongruent items (e.g., when 
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Republicans were attempting to recollect change for a liberal position). The means were identical 
in both bins (Ms = 0.21, t < 1). 
Finally, none of the subject level variables (objective political expertise, subjective political 
expertise, age, and education) influenced change recollection accuracy, all ps > .09. 
Response Time Results 
Response times were measured in seconds, and represented the time from the presentation of the 
cue to the submission of the subject response. Response times were similar for recalling the 
different item types, repetition = 16.46, control = 17.98, and changed = 17.26, F = 1.05. The 
response times for recollecting change were also similar, repetition = 1.66, control = 1.86, and 
changed = 1.95, F = 1.92. Furthermore, recollecting change did not influence the reaction times 
for recalling a changed item, (change recollected = 17.48, change not recollected = 17.24, t = 
1.06) or for the change recollection judgment itself (change recollected = 1.75, change not 
recollected = 2.05, t < 1). 
Changing Towards and Away 
Is it easier for a voter to remember a change in position if a politician makes a shift to be more in 
line with the voter’s own views? Or is it easier when the politician shifts to a position that is 
more different from the voter’s position? To address the question I grouped subjects by their 
self-reported political orientation, and omitted all of the self-reported independents. Then I 
calculated the average recall for the changed items when the change was towards or away from 
the subjects’ own orientation. A change towards item would be a self-reported Democrat 
recalling an item where the Republican candidate shifted from a strong position to a weak 
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position (or the Democrat shifting from a weak position to a strong position), whereas a change 
away item would be a self-reported Democrat recalling an item where the Republican shifted 
from a weak positions to a strong position (or the Democrat shifting from a strong position to a 
weak position). Subjects had better recall when candidates changed away from the subjects’ own 
view (M = .41, SEM = .02) than when candidates changed towards the subjects’ own view (M = 
.37, SEM = .02), t(99) = 2.26, p = .03, d = 0.18.  The same pattern occurred when subjects were 
grouped by their objective political orientation, rather than their self-reported orientation. In 
contrast, change recollection did not appear to be affected by the direction of the change. The hit 
rate for the change items was similar regardless of whether the candidate was changing away (M 
= .39, SEM = .03) or changing towards (M = .40, SEM = .02) the subject’s own position, t < 1. 
Again, an identical pattern occurred when grouping subjects by their objective political 
orientation. In sum, subjects may be better at recalling changed positions when the candidates are 
shifting away from their own political views than when they are shifting towards their own 
political views. 
Subject Judgment Results 
In general, the subject judgments results (i.e., voting choices, estimates of future flip flopping 
etc.) were similar regardless of whether the self-reported or objective measure of political 
orientation was used to group subjects. However, there were a few exceptions for the 
trustworthiness and likability ratings–some main effects that occurred when using the self-
reported measure did not replicate when using the objective measure. Critically, the interactions 
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(suggesting that subjects preferred the candidates from their own parties) were still significant, 
meaning the main effects should not be granted too much weight (Field, Miles, & Field, 2012). 
For the trustworthiness ratings, using self-reported political orientation as an independent 
variable suggested a significant interaction, but also a main effect of candidate party, where the 
Democratic candidate was trusted more than the Republican at Debate 1. Using the objective 
measure of political orientation replicated the interaction, F(2, 123) = 48.02, p = .001, ηp2 = .44, 
but failed to reveal the main effect of candidate party, F = 1.16. Collapsing across subject 
political orientation entirely and looking only at the average trust ratings for the two candidates 
suggested that the Democrat was indeed trusted more than the Republican, t(125) = 3.73, p = 
.001, d = 0.55. An identical pattern occurred after the recall test where the interaction still 
occurred, F(2, 123) = 48.02, p = .001, ηp2 = .44, but the main effect of candidate party 
disappeared when objective orientation was used to group subjects, F = 1.16.  Again, collapsing 
across political orientation suggested that the Democrat was trusted more than the Republican, 
t(125) = 3.62, p = .001, d = 0.52 after the recall test. 
The likability ratings yielded a similar pattern at both Debate 1 and after the test. Using self-
reported orientation led to a significant interaction (subjects liked the candidates from their own 
party), a main effect of candidate party (the Democrat was liked more than the Republican), and 
a main effect of self-reported political orientation (the Republicans tended to like both candidates 
more). With objective political orientation, the interaction occurred at Debate 1 and after the test, 
F(2, 123) = 99.26, p < .001, ηp2 = .62 and F(2, 123) = 95.94, p < .001, ηp2 = .61 respectively, but 
the main effects disappeared. At Debate 1 there was no main effect of candidate party, F < 1, or 
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subject orientation, F < 1, whereas at the recall tests there was only a marginal effect of 
candidate party, F(1, 123) = 3.63, p = .059, ηp2 = .03, and no effect of subject orientation, F < 1. 
Collapsing across all subjects revealed that Democrat was liked more than the Republican at 
Debate 1, t(125) = 3.95, p = .001, d = 0.64,  and at Debate 2, t(125) = 4.62, p = .001, d = 0.74.  
The discrepancy between the self-reported and objective measures of political orientation likely 
results from the finding that subjects are more likely more liberal than they claim to be (Zell & 
Bernstein, 2014). Regardless, the interaction was significant in both cases, and should trump 
concerns over whether a main effect was present. 
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Appendix F: Additional Results and 
Discussion - Experiment 2 
Appendix F contains additional analyses not reported in the results section of Experiment 2. 
Some of these analyses were basic checks (e.g., to see if there were any effects of 
counterbalancing order) whereas other analyses addressed the main questions from Experiment 
1. All post-hoc comparisons used a Bonferroni correction unless otherwise noted. 
Recall 
There were several additional recall analyses not reported in the main text. First, 
counterbalancing condition did not influence overall recall (F < 1). Second, recall for the strong 
items (M = .50, SEM = .02) was better than recall for the weak items (M = .37, SEM = .02), t(99) 
= 11.14, p < .001, d = 0.72, across all item types. This pattern was consistent with Experiment 1, 
but inconsistent with previous work using similar materials. (Putnam et al.  2014).  
Third, I checked to see whether subject political orientation or the candidate party affiliation 
affected recall. Subjects had similar levels of recall for the Democratic (M = .43, SEM = .02) and 
Republican (M = .44, SEM = .02) candidates (t < 1). Furthermore, self-reported Democratic 
subjects had similar recall (M = .44, SEM = .03) to self-reported Republican subjects (M = .43, 
SEM = .02) (t < 1). Using the full 7-point political orientation scale or the objective measure of 
subject political orientation also failed to reveal any effects of political orientation on recall.  
Fourth, although a small congeniality effect occurred in Experiment 1 (subjects were better at 
recalling attitude-consistent information than attitude-inconsistent information), this pattern did 
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not replicate in Experiment 2.  A 2 (subject self-reported political orientation: Democrat, 
Republican) x 2 (candidate political party: Democrat, Republican) mixed-model ANOVA with 
recall as the dependent variable failed to reveal any significant main effects or interactions (Fs < 
1.99). In addition, recall for the congruent items (e.g., Democrats recalling liberal positions; M 
= .44, SEM = .02) was similar to recall for the incongruent items (e.g., Democrats recalling 
conservative positions; M = .43, SEM = .02), t = 1.42. Similar outcomes occurred if the objective 
measure of political orientation was used instead of the self-report. Thus, recall was similar 
regardless of whether there was a match between the subject’s political orientation and the 
content of the statement they were recalling, failing to replicate the congeniality effect that 
occurred in Experiment 1. 
Finally, I also checked to see whether any subject demographic variables affected recall. 
Objective political expertise was modestly correlated with recall (rτ = .21, p = .006) suggesting 
that subjects who scored higher on the political expertise quiz also recalled more items in the 
experiment. Recall did not correlate with self-reported political expertise, being born in the U.S., 
age, or education (ps > .067).  
Change Recollection 
For the additional change recollection analyses, the dependent variable was Hits – False Alarms 
unless otherwise mentioned. Several analyses were conducted. First, counterbalancing order 
failed to influence change recollection (F = 1.22). Second, change recollection for the strong 
items (M = .18, SEM = .02) was just barely better than for the weak items (M = .13, SEM = .02), 
t(99) = 2.00, p = .049, d = 0.24. This pattern did not occur in Experiment 1. 
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Third, political orientation did not influence change recollection accuracy. Subjects were equally 
accurate at recollecting change for the Democratic and the Republican candidates, (t = 1.08). 
Furthermore, subject political orientation did not influence change recollection accuracy, either 
as measured by self-report (F < 1) or the objective measure (F < 1).  Thus, just as in Experiment 
1, subject political orientation and the candidate’s political party failed to affect change 
recollection. 
Fourth, a 2 (self-reported subject political orientation: Democrat, Republican) x 2 (candidate 
political party: Democrat, Republican) mixed-model ANOVA with change recollection accuracy 
as the dependent variable failed to reveal any significant main effects or interactions, (Fs < 1.99). 
A similar pattern occurred when the objective measure of political orientation was used. The lack 
of an interaction suggests that subjects were equally capable of recollecting change, regardless of 
whether the position was consistent or inconsistent with their own political views. Experiment 1 
showed the same pattern. This suggests that there was no congeniality effect in recollecting 
change.  
Finally, none of the subject-demographic variables affected change recollection. Objective 
political expertise, self-reported political expertise, being born in the US, age, and education all 
failed to influence change recollection (ps > .181). 
Response Time Results 
The response times for recalling the different item types were similar: repetition = 14.06, control 
= 14.55, changed = 14.76, F = 1.92. As were the reaction times for recollection change: 
repetition = 1.63, control = 1.60, changed = 1.70, F = 1.63. Recollecting change did not 
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influence reaction times for recalling a changed item (change recollected = 14.39, change not 
recollected = 14.65, t < 1), or for the change recollection judgment itself (change recollected = 
1.75, change not recollected = 1.70, t = 1.30). 
Changing Towards and Away 
As in Experiment 1 (reported in Appendix E) subjects in Experiment 2 had better recall for 
changed positions when the candidates were moving away from the subject’s own political views 
(M = .36, SEM = .02) than when the candidates moved towards the subject’s own views (M 
= .28, SEM = .02), t(99) = 3.87, p < .001, d = 0.42. Thus, subjects may have more accurate recall 
for a candidate’s position when he is moving away from the subject’s own political views (as 
measured by the subject’s self-reported political orientation) compared to a candidate moving 
towards the subject’s own political views. This advantage, however, did not extend to change 
recollection; subjects were equally likely to recollect change when the change was away from 
their own position (M = .31, SEM = .02) than when it was towards their own position (M = .33, 
SEM = .02), t < 1.  
Subject Judgments 
Table F1 displays the voting results from Experiment 2. Table F2 displays the other judgments 
that subjects made after Debate 1 and after the recall test as a function of subjects’ self-reported 
political orientation. In general, similar patterns emerged compared to Experiment 1: voting 
preferences were largely along party lines, estimates of future change went up after the recall 
test, and subjects had more positive attitudes towards the candidate from their own political 
party. One major difference was that in Experiment 1 several measures correlated with the 
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change recollection hit rate for the subjects, but this did not occur in Experiment 2. One 
explanation for this difference is the inclusion of the news phase in Experiment 2, which 
influenced the change recollection rates. 
Table F1: Voting Results for the Two Candidates After Debate 1 and Debate 2 by Subject 
Political Orientation, Experiment 2 
  Debate 1  Debate 2 
Subject Political Orientation Democrat Republican  Democrat Republican 
Total Votes  64 36  64 36 
Self-Reported       
Democrats  49 1  50 0 
Republicans  15 35  14 36 
 
Voting. Table F1 shows the voting results after Debate 1 and the recall test as a function of the 
subjects’ self-reported political orientation. The Democratic subjects stuck to party lines, 
whereas the Republican subjects had a mixture of voting preferences. This discrepancy may be 
due to several of the self-reported Republicans actually having attitudes more consistent with 
independents or moderate Democrat as indicated by the objective measure. Eight subjects 
changed their votes between Debate 1 and the recall test.  
Estimates of Future Change. Table F2 displays the results of the subject judgments broken down 
by self-reported political orientation. The third and fourth columns display the estimates of future 
change for each candidate at Debate 1 and after the recall test. At Debate 1, a 2 (subject political 
orientation: Democrat, Republican) x 2 (candidate party: Democrat, Republican) mixed-model 
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ANOVA revealed a main effect of candidate party, suggesting that subjects predicted that the 
Democratic candidate would be more likely to change positions in the future than the Republican 
candidate, F(1, 98) = 11.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .11. There was no main effect of subject political 
orientation or a significant interaction (both Fs < 1.98). At the recall test a different pattern 
emerged. A 2 x 2 ANOVA failed to show a main effect of candidate party or an interaction (both 
Fs < 2.15), but did show a main effect of subject political orientation. This main effect indicated 
that the self-reported Democrats (M = 47.03, SEM = 2.71) provided lower future change 
estimates than the self-reported Republicans (M = 55.02, SEM = 2.54), F(1, 98) = 4.62, p = .03, 
ηp2 = .05. Thus, at Debate 1, subjects thought the Democrat was more likely to change positions 
in the future than the Republican (replicating Experiment 1), but after the recall test, provided 
similar future change estimates for both candidates. However, after the recall test, the Republican 
subjects provided higher future change estimates than the Democrats (which did not occur in 
Experiment 1). Finally, two paired-sample t-tests confirmed that subjects provided higher ratings 
for both candidates after the recall test than after Debate 1, ts(99) > 4.18, ps < .001, ds > 0.48, 
suggesting that experiencing the candidates change positions led to the higher estimates of future 
change. 
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In contrast to Experiment 1, the recollection of change hit rates for the individual candidates did 
not correlate with the estimates of future change for those candidates after the recall test (ps 
> .409). However, the change in estimates between Debate 1 and the recall test was correlated 
with the change recollection rate for the Republican candidate (r =. 24 p = .018), and marginally 
correlated for the Democratic candidate (r = .19, p = .059), generally reaffirming what was found 
in Experiment 1: higher change recollection rates were associated with an increase in the future 
change estimates from Debate 1 to the recall test. 
Estimates of Past Change. After the recall test, subjects were asked to estimate how often each 
candidate had changed positions across debates. The first two columns of Table F2 show those 
estimates for each candidate, broken down by the subjects’ self-reported political orientation. A 
2 (subject political orientation: Democrat, Republican) x 2 (candidate party: Democrat, 
Republican) mixed-model ANOVA failed to reveal any main effects or interactions (Fs < 1.79) 
indicating that neither the political orientation of the subjects nor the candidate’s political party 
influenced the estimates of past change. Curiously, in contrast to Experiment 1, the hit rates for 
the candidates did not correlate with the estimates of past change (ps > .288). 
Trustworthiness Ratings. The fifth and sixth columns of Table F2 display the trustworthiness 
ratings after Debate 1 and the recall test. At Debate 1 there was a main effect of candidate 
political party, F(1, 98) = 4.11, p = .045, ηp2 = .04, indicating that the Democratic candidate was 
deemed more trustworthy than the Republican candidate, and an interaction, F(1, 98) = 60.62, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .38, suggesting that subjects trusted the candidate from their own political party 
more than the candidate from the opposing party. There was no main effect of subject political 
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orientation (F < 1). After the recall test, an identical pattern emerged: the Democratic candidate 
was deemed more trustworthy than the Republican, F(1, 98) = 4.30, p = .041, ηp2 = .04, and a 
significant interaction suggested subjects trusted the candidates from their own party, F(1, 98) = 
56.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .364 (again there was no main effect of subject political orientation, F < 1). 
In addition, two paired-samples t-test indicated that subjects trusted both candidates more after 
Debate 1 than after the recall test, ts(99) > 2.65, ps < .009, ds > 0.18. This pattern of results 
generally replicates what was found in Experiment 1. 
Experiment 1 showed that the trustworthiness ratings after the recall test were negatively 
correlated with the change recollection rates. In contrast, in Experiment 2, there were no 
significant correlations for either candidate, either for the trustworthiness judgments that 
occurred after the recall test (ps > .144), or for the change in trustworthiness judgment between 
Debate 1 and the recall test (ps > .067). 
Likability Ratings. The last two columns of Table F2 display the likability ratings for the two 
candidates after Debate 1 and after the recall test broken down by subject political orientation. At 
Debate 1 there was a main effect of candidate party, F(1, 98) = 25.65, p < .001, ηp2 = .21, 
indicating that the Democrat was liked more than the Republican, no main effect of subject 
political orientation, F = 1.10, and a significant interaction, F(1, 98) = 138.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .59, 
indicating that candidates preferred the candidate from their own political party. An identical 
pattern occurred after the recall test: there was a main effect of candidate party, F(1, 98) = 23.17, 
p = .001, ηp2 = .19, no main effect of subject political orientation, F = 2.63, p = .108, ηp2 = .03, 
and an interaction, F(1, 98) = 143.39, p < .001, ηp2 = .59. The interaction replicated what was 
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found in Experiment 1. Two paired-samples t-tests showed that subjects like the Democratic 
subject more at Debate 1 than after the recall test, t(99) = 2.64, p = .010, d = 0.12, but that they 
liked the Republican candidate similarly at both times, t(99) = 1.25, p = .213 (Experiment 1 
showed an opposite pattern, with subjects liking the Republican candidate less after the recall 
test and liking the Democrat equally at both times). 
Finally, the change recollection hit rates for both candidates did not correlate with either the 
recall test likability ratings (ps > .678) or the change in likability ratings between Debate 1 and 
the recall test (ps > .075). 
Effects of News Statements Response on Recall and Change Recollection 
The focal analysis of Experiment 2 examined how making an accurate or inaccurate news 
verification response influenced later recall and change recollection for the different item types. 
As discussed in the main text, during the news phase subject responses could be categorized into 
one of three groups: a correct endorsement (accurately verifying a statement, e.g., responding 
True to a flip-flop statement about a changed item), a misinformation endorsement (endorsing an 
untrue statement, e.g., responding True to a flip-flop statement about a repetition item), or a miss 
response (failing to accurately verify a statement but not endorsing an untrue statement, e.g., 
responding False to a flip-flop statement about a changed item). In the main text the analyses 
grouped the misinformation and miss categories together for ease of interpretation. As shown 
here, those two categories of responses did not influence recall, but did have an effect on change 
recollection. 
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Figure F1 shows recall for the different item types as a function of the different news phase 
responses (the correct responses are included here for comparison). A 3 (item type: repetition, 
control, changed) x 2 (news accuracy: misinformation, miss) within-subjects ANVOA failed to 
reveal a main effect of news accuracy, F(1, 45) = 0.76, p = .389, ηp2 = .02, suggesting that 
misinformation endorsements and misses had similar effects on subsequent recall.   
 
 
 
Figure F1: Recall by item type conditionalized on news phase verification response. 
 
Table F3 shows change recollection for the different item types as a function of the different 
news responses (again, the accurate responses are included here for comparison, but omitted 
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from the analysis). A 3 (item type: repetition, control, changed) x 2 (news accuracy: 
misinformation, miss) within-subjects ANVOA failed to reveal a main effect of news accuracy 
(F < 1) but did reveal a significant interaction, F(2, 90) = 4.12, p = .019, ηp2 = .08. Simple effects 
analysis revealed that the interaction was driven by the repetition items, where there was more 
erroneous change recollection following a misinformation endorsement than a miss, t(45) = 2.47, 
p = .017, d = 0.42. For both the control and the changed items, change recollection was similar 
following a misinformation endorsement or a miss, ts < 1.60. Thus, if subjects make a 
misinformation endorsement during the news phase, they may be more likely to erroneously 
recollect change for the repetition items. Again, for the control items, a misinformation response 
could be characterized by responding true to a straight statement or a flip-flop statement, thus 
any effects of making a misinformation response on change recollection could be cancelling each 
other out. 
Table F3: Probabilities of Change Recollection and Signal Detection Measures in 
Experiment 2, Broken Down by News Verification Accuracy 
 Item Type  SDT Measure 
News Verification 
Response 
Repetition Control 
(FAs) 
Changed (Hits) 
 d’ c 
Accurate .09 (.01) .17 (.03) .54 (.03)  1.47 (0.16) 0.44 (0.09) 
Misinformation .27 (.05) .17 (.02) .21 (.02)  0.17 (0.08) 1.12 (0.08) 
Miss .14 (.03) .19 (.02) .25 (.02)  0.23 (0.08) 0.99 (0.07) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses represent standard error.  
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Appendix G: Additional Results and 
Discussion - Experiment 3 
Appendix G contains brief descriptions of two pilot experiments along with additional analyses 
not reported in the results section of Experiment 3. Because Experiment 3 did not have a 
politically diverse sample (there was only one Republican) some analyses that were reported in 
earlier experiments are not reported here. 
Pilot Experiment 3A: Change Detection 
One concern with the design of Experiment 3 was that subjects would ignore the introductory 
statements and focus only on the position statements. The goal of Pilot Experiment 3A was to 
show that the introductory statements could affect memory. The design was a variation of 
Experiment 3. Subjects studied statements at Debate 1 and Debate 2 as in Experiment 3. During 
Debate 2, the statements were presented along with the introductory phrases, as described in the 
methods section of Experiment 3. Table G1 presents the full list of introductory phrases. 
However, in the pilot experiment subjects completed a measure of change detection during the 
Debate 2 presentations, which was the only dependent variable in the experiment. Subjects were 
instructed to read the Debate 2 positions, but to press a “changed” button if they detected that a 
candidate had changed positions. If they did not notice a change in position, they pressed the 
“next” button to advance to the next item (presentation was self-paced). Subjects were warned 
ahead of time that the candidates might not always be telling the truth when they claimed to 
change positions. As in Experiment 3, every item type had an introductory phrase. Thus, the 
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experiment was a 3 (item type: repetition, control, changed) x 2 (introductory phrase type: 
neutral, looking back) within-subjects design with change detection as the dependent variable. 
Table G1: Introductory Phrases Used in Experiment 3 
Introductory Phrase Type 
Neutral  Looking Back 
I’m glad this topic came up today  
In contrast to my previous position, I now 
believe that 
Let me take this opportunity to say 
that  
Since the last debate I’ve shifted on this - I 
think that 
My message is that  
I recently changed my view on this topic - I 
now believe that 
I hope everyone in the room 
understands my position – that  
In the past I may have said something else, 
but I will argue that 
My stance on this topic is that  I’ve changed my mind. I think that 
Its certainly that case that I believe 
that  
I have altered my stance on this issue. I am 
of the opinion that  
 
 
Twenty-three subjects from the same pool as Experiment 1 participated. Table G2 shows the 
change detection rates, broken down by item type and introductory phrase type. A 3 (item type: 
repetition, control, changed) x 2 (introductory phrase type: neutral, looking back) repeated 
measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of item type, F(2, 44) = 34.93, p < .001, ηp2 = .61, a 
main effect of introductory phrase, F(1, 22) = 18.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .45, but no interaction, F < 1. 
As seen in the table, change detection was highest for the changed items, moderate for the 
control items, and lowest for the repetition items; post-hoc analyses confirmed that all 
comparisons were significant, (ps < .001). The looking back statements (M = .32, SEM = .04) led 
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to higher change detection rates than the neutral statements (M = .18, SEM = .02). The lack of an 
interaction suggested that the looking back phrases did not lead to more accurate change 
detection. Indeed, d’ was similar in both conditions (t < 1). However, the introductory phrases 
did lead to a criterion shift; As measured by c, the looking back statements led to a more liberal 
response bias for change detection than the neutral statements, t(22) = 3.13, p = .005, d = 0.62.  
Table G2: Change Detection Rates as a Function of Item Type and Introductory Phrase Type 
Along With Signal Detection Measures in Pilot Experiment 3A 
 Item Type  SDT Measure 
Introductory Phrase Type Repetition Control Changed  d’ c 
Neutral .05 (.02) .16 (.03) .34 (.04)  0.67 (.19) .82 (.09) 
Looking Back .18 (.04) .30 (.05) .49 (.06)  0.63 (.17) .42 (.17) 
Note: Change detection occurred during Debate 2. Signal Detection measures of accuracy (d’) and 
criterion (c) were calculated using the change detection rate for changed items as hits and the change 
detection rates for control items as false alarms. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
The results of Pilot 3A suggested that subjects did attend to the introductory phrases. Subjects 
were more likely to report detecting change when a statement was paired with a looking back 
phrase than a neutral phase. This finding was reassuring for the main goal of Experiment 3, in 
showing that subjects did attend to the statements. But the finding was also the first indication 
that the looking back phrases might not be effectively cueing subjects to look back to the Debate 
1 positions. Instead, the looking back statements appeared to simply cue subjects that a change 
had occurred. 
Pilot Experiment 3B: Change Recollection 
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Pilot Experiment 3B was similar to Pilot Experiment 3A except that rather than completing a 
measure of change detection, subjects completed a measure of change recollection. The goal of 
this pilot experiment was to ensure that the introductory statements influenced later change 
recollection. During Debate 2, the position statements were presented along with the introductory 
phrases as in Experiment 3. No change detection measure was collected. Also, subjects were not 
warned that the candidates might be lying when they said they changed positions (paralleling 
Experiment 3). For the final test subjects simply completed the change recollection measure from 
Experiment 3 without attempting to recall each position first. Subjects were presented with 
candidate information and a topic and were asked if the candidate changed positions on that 
topic. Subjects then pressed a “yes” or “no” button before moving on to the next item. Twenty-
three subjects participated. 
The results paralleled those of Pilot Experiment 3A.  Table G3 shows the change recollection 
rates broken down by item type and whether the statements were paired with a neutral or looking 
back phrase. A 3 (item type: repetition, control, changed) x 2 (introductory phrase type: neutral, 
looking back) revealed a main effect of item type, F(2, 44) = 9.91, p < .001, ηp2 = .31, and a main 
effect of introductory phrase type, F(1, 22) = 12.84, p = .002, ηp2 = .37, but no interaction (F = 
1.07). Post-hoc comparisons revealed that change recollection was higher for the changed items 
than the repetition or control items, ts(22) > 3.10, ps < .005, ds > 0.52, but that the repetition and 
control items led to similar change recollection rates, t = 1.40. The looking back statements (M 
= .33 SEM = .04) led to higher change recollection rates than the neutral statements (M = .26 
SEM = .04), t(22) = 3.55, p = .002, d = 0.39. The lack of an interaction suggested that the looking 
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back phrases did not lead to more accurate change recollection. Indeed, d’ was similar in both 
conditions (t < 1). However, the introductory phrases did lead to a criterion shift. As measured 
by c, the looking back statements led to a more liberal response bias for change recollection than 
the neutral statements, t(22) = 4.42, p < .001, d = 0.48. 
 
Table G3: Change Detection Rates as a Function of Item Type and Introductory Phrase Type 
Along With Signal Detection Measures in Pilot Experiment 3B 
 Item Type  SDT Measure 
Introductory Phrase Type Repetition Control Changed  d’ c 
Neutral .23 (.05) .22 (.04 ) .32 (.05)  0.30 (.13) .75 (.13) 
Looking Back .26 (.04) .31 (.04) .41 (.04)  0.31 (.15) .45 (.12) 
Note: Change recollection occurred after Debate 2. Signal Detection measures of accuracy (d’) and 
criterion (c) were calculated using the change recollection rate for changed items as hits and the change 
recollection rates for control items as false alarms. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Thus, just as with the change detection pilot, the looking back phrases did not lead to more 
accurate change recollection. Instead, the looking back phrases led to a criterion shift, where 
subjects were more likely to report remembering change after a looking back statements. Again, 
this finding was reassuring for Experiment 3, because the introductory statements did affect later 
change recollection, but worrisome in that they did not encourage more accurate change 
recollection. 
Finally, I ran a third pilot experiment that was identical to Pilot Experiment 3B except that 
subjects were explicitly warned that the politicians might not be telling the truth when they 
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claimed to change positions. The results, however, were nearly identical to Experiment 3B, so a 
warning was not included in Experiment 3. 
Experiment 3: Additional Results and Discussion 
Recall 
There were several additional recall analyses not reported in the main text. First, 
counterbalancing condition did not influence overall recall (F < 1). Second, recall for the strong 
items (M = .55, SEM = .03) was better than recall for the weak items (M = .41, SEM = .03), t(49) 
= 8.00, p < .001, d = 0.74. Third, I checked to see whether the political orientation of the subjects 
or the candidates affected recall. Subjects had similar levels of recall for the Democratic (M 
= .49, SEM = .03) and Republican (M = .47, SEM = .03) candidates (t = 1.46). Furthermore, self-
reported Democratic subjects had similar recall (M = .50, SEM = .03) to the self-reported 
independents, (M = .46, SEM = .04), as did the one self-reported Republican subject (M = .42, 
SEM = .03) (F < 1). Using the full 7-point political orientation scale or the objective measure of 
subject political orientation similarly failed to reveal any effects of political orientation on recall. 
Given the sample was not politically diverse, I did not examine whether a congeniality effect 
occurred in recall or change recollection. Finally, recall was not correlated with objective 
political expertise, self-reported political expertise, age, or education (ps > .126).  
Change Recollection 
For the additional change recollection analyses, the dependent variable was Hits - False Alarms 
unless otherwise mentioned. Several analyses were conducted. First, counterbalancing order did 
not influence change recollection (F < 1). Second, change recollection was similar for the strong 
(M = .15, SEM = .03) and weak items (M = .17, SEM = .03), t < 1. This pattern replicated 
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Experiment 1; Experiment 2 showed a marginal advantage in recollecting change for the strong 
items. 
Third, change recollection was similar for the Democratic and Republican candidates (t < 1). 
Change recollection accuracy was also similar regardless of the subject’s political orientation, 
whether it was measured by self-report (F < 1) or the objective measure (F = 1.13).  Thus, just as 
in the previous experiments, subject political orientation and the candidate’s political party failed 
to influence change recollection. 
Finally, none of the subject-demographic variables affected change recollection. Objective 
political expertise, self-reported political expertise, being born in the US, age, and education all 
failed to influence change recollection (ps > .082). 
Reaction Time Results 
The reaction times for recalling the different item types were similar: repetition = 14.21, control 
= 14.45, changed = 15.17, F = 1.31. As were the reaction times for recollection change: 
repetition = 1.63, control = 1.77, changed = 1.60, F = 1.53. However, recollecting change (M = 
16.35, SEM = 1.23) led to a slower response time for recalling a changed item than not 
recollecting change (M = 14.79, SEM = 0.92). Subjects may have had more detailed responses 
for items where they remembered change, which may have led to the longer response times 
(response time was measured when subjects submitted their response). Recollecting change for a 
changed item did not influence reaction time for the change recollection judgment itself (change 
recollected = 1.93, change not recollected = 1.77, t = 1.07). 
